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Abstract. We introduce a new combinatorial primitive called programmable hash functions (PHFs).
PHFs can be used to program the output of a hash function such that it contains solved or unsolved
discrete logarithm instances with a certain probability. This is a technique originally used for security
proofs in the random oracle model. We give a variety of standard model realizations of PHFs (with
different parameters).
The programmability makes PHFs a suitable tool to obtain black-box proofs of cryptographic protocols
when considering adaptive attacks. We propose generic digital signature schemes from the strong RSA
problem and from some hardness assumption on bilinear maps that can be instantiated with any PHF.
Our schemes offer various improvements over known constructions. In particular, for a reasonable choice
of parameters, we obtain short standard model digital signatures over bilinear maps.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Programmable Hash Functions
A group hash function is an efficiently computable function that maps binary strings into a group G. We
propose the concept of a programmable hash function which is a keyed group hash function that can behave in
two indistinguishable ways, depending on how the key is generated. If the standard key generation algorithm
is used, then the hash function fulfills its normal functionality, i.e., it properly hashes its inputs into a group
G. The alternative (trapdoor) key generation algorithm outputs a key that is indistinguishable from the one
output by the standard algorithm. It furthermore generates some additional secret trapdoor information
that depends on two (user-specified) generators g and h from the group. This trapdoor information makes
it possible to relate the output of the hash function H to g and h: for any input X, one obtains integers aX
and bX such that the relation
H(X) = gaXhbX ∈ G (1)
holds. For the PHF to be (m,n)-programmable we require that for all choices of X1, . . . , Xm and Z1, . . . , Zn
such that for all i, j it is true that Xi 6= Zj , it holds that aXi = 0 but aZj 6= 0, with significant probability:
Pr [aX1 = . . . = aXm = 0 ∧ aZ1 , . . . , aZn 6= 0] ≥ 1/ poly . (2)
Hence parameter m controls the number of elements X for which we can hope to have H(X) = hbX ; parameter
n controls the number of elements Z for which we can hope to have H(Z) = gaZhbZ for some aZ 6= 0.
The concept becomes useful in groups with hard discrete logarithms and when the trapdoor key generation
algorithm does not know the discrete logarithm of h to the basis g. It is then possible to program the hash
function such that the hash images of all possible choices X1, . . . , Xm of m inputs do not depend on g (since
aX = 0). At the same time the hash images of all possible choices Z1, . . . , Zn of n (different) inputs do
depend on g in a known way (since aZ 6= 0).
Intuitively, this resembles a scenario we are often confronted with in “provable security”: for some of
the hash outputs we know the discrete logarithm, and for some we do not. This situation appears naturally
during a reduction that involves an adaptive adversary. Concretely, knowledge of the discrete logarithms of
some hash queries can be used to simulate, e.g., a signing oracle for an adversary (which would normally
require knowledge of a secret signing key). On the other hand, once the adversary produces, e.g., a signature
on its own, our hope is that this signature corresponds to a hash query for which the we do not know the
discrete logarithm. This way, the adversary has produced a piece of nontrivial secret information which can
be used to break an underlying computational assumption.
This way of “programming” a hash function is very popular in the context of random oracles [6] (which,
in a sense, are ideally programmable hash functions), and has been used to derive proofs of the adaptive
security of cryptosystems [7,14,12].
An (m, poly)-PHF is an (m,n)-PHF for all polynomials n. A (poly,m)-PHF is defined the same way. Note
that, using this notation, a random oracle implies a (poly, 1)-PHF.
Instantiations. As our central instantiation of a PHF we use the following function which was originally
introduced by Chaum et. al. [23] as a collision-resistant hash function. The “multi-generator” hash function
HMG : {0, 1}` → G is defined as HMG(X) := h0
∏`
i=1 h
Xi
i , where the hi are public generators of the group
and X = (X1, . . . , X`). After its discovery in [23] it was also used in other constructions (e.g., [19,24,4,65]),
relying on other useful properties beyond collision resistance. Specifically, in the analysis of his identity-based
encryption scheme, Waters [65] implicitly proved that, using our notation, HMG is a (1, poly)-programmable
hash function. Our main result concerning instantiations of PHFs is a new analysis of HMG showing that it
is also a (2, 1)-PHF. Furthermore, we can use our new techniques to prove better bounds on the (1, poly)-
programmability of HMG. Our analysis uses random walk techniques and is different from the one implicitly
given in [65].
Variations. The concept of PHFs can be extended to randomized programmable hash functions (RPHFs).
A RPHF is like a PHF whose input takes an additional parameter, the randomness. Our main constructions
of a randomized hash functions are RHF and RHL. They are both (1, 1)-programmable and have short
parameters. In some applications (e.g., for RSA signatures) we need a special type a PHF which we call
bounded PHF. Essentially, for bounded PHFs we need to know a certain upper bound on the |aX | from (1),
for all X.
1.2 Applications
Collision Resistant Hashing. We aim to use PHFs as a tool to provide black-box proofs for various
cryptographic protocols. As a toy example let us sketch why, in prime-order groups with hard discrete
logarithms, any (1, 1)-PHF implies collision resistant hashing. Setting up H using the trapdoor generation
algorithm will remain unnoticed for an adversary, but any collision H(X) = H(Z) with X 6= Z gives rise
to an equation gaXhbX = H(X) = H(Z) = gaZhbZ with known exponents. Since the hash function is (1, 1)-
programmable we have that, with non-negligible probability, aX = 0 and aZ 6= 0 (so in particular aX 6= aZ).
This implies h = gaZ/(bX−bZ), revealing the discrete logarithm of h to the base g. (Note that already the
weaker condition aX 6= aZ is sufficient to imply collision resistance.)
Generic Bilinear Map signatures. We propose the following generic Bilinear Maps signature scheme
with respect to a group hash function H. The signature of a message X is defined as the tuple
SIGBM[H] : sig = (H(X)
1
x+s , s) ∈ G× {0, 1}η, (3)
where s is interpreted as a random η-bit integer, and x ∈ Z|G| is the secret key. The signature can be verified
with the help of the public key g, gx and a bilinear map. This signature scheme can be seen as a generalization
(resp. variation) of the schemes from [11,21,57]. Our main theorem concerning the Bilinear Map signatures
states that if, for some m ≥ 1, H is an (m, 1)-programmable hash function and the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman
(q-SDH) assumption [11] holds, then the above signature scheme is unforgeable against chosen message
attacks [39]. Here, the parameter m controls the size η = η(m) of the randomness s. For “80-bit security”
and assuming the scheme establishes no more than q = 230 signatures [7], we can choose η = 30 + 80/m such
that η = 70 is sufficient when using our (2, 1)-PHF HMG. The total signature size amounts to 160 + 70 = 230
bits. (See below for details.)
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Generic RSA signatures. We propose the following generic RSA signature scheme with respect to a
group hash function H. The signature of a message X is defined as the tuple
SIGRSA[H] : sig = (H(X)
1/e, e) ∈ ZN × {0, 1}η, (4)
where e is a η bit prime. The eth root can be computed using the factorization of N = pq which is contained
in the secret key. Our main theorem concerning RSA signatures states that if, for some m ≥ 1, H is an
(m, 1)-programmable hash function and the strong RSA assumption holds, then the above signature scheme
is unforgeable against chosen message attacks. Again, the parameter m controls the size of the prime as
η ≈ 30 + 80/m. Furthermore, our generic constructions explain signature schemes by Okamoto [57], Fischlin
[33], variants of Zhu [66,67] and Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [21], and shed light why other proposals are
not secure.
Other applications. BLS signatures [15] are an example of “full-domain hash” (FDH) signature schemes [6].
Using the properties of a (m, 1)-programmable hash function one can give a black-box reduction from m-time
unforgeability of SIGBLS to breaking the CDH assumption. The same reduction also holds for all full-domain
hash signatures, for example also RSA-FDH. Consequently, with a (poly, 1) PHF we obtain full unforgeability
of full-domain signature schemes. Similarly, the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [13] can be proved secure under
the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption when instantiated with a (poly, 1)-PHF. Unfortunately, we do not
know of any standard-model instantiation of (poly, 1)-PHFs. This fact may be not too surprising given the
impossibility results from [30].3
It is furthermore possible to reduce the security of Waters’ IBE and signature scheme [65] to breaking
the CDH assumption, when instantiated with a (1, poly)-programmable hash function. This explains Waters’
specific analysis in our PHF framework. Furthermore, our improved bound on the (1, poly)-programmability
of HMG gives a (slightly) tighter security reduction for Waters’ IBE and signature scheme.
1.3 A Conceptual Perspective
We would like underline the importance of programmable hash functions as a concept for designing and
analyzing cryptographic protocols in the Diffie-Hellman and RSA setting. The central idea is that one can
partition the output of a hash function into two types of instances (c.f. (1) and (2)) that can be treated differ-
ently by a security reduction. This is reminiscent to what proofs in the random oracle model usually do (e.g.,
[7,14,12]) and hence PHFs offer a simple and abstract framework for designing and analyzing cryptographic
protocols without explicitly relying on random oracles. More importantly, a large body of cryptographic
protocols with security in the standard model are using — implicitly or explicitly — the partitioning trick
that is formalized in PRFs. To mention only a few examples, this ranges from collision-resistant hashing
[23,4], digital signature schemes [11,65] (also in various flavors [57,61,46,8]), chosen-ciphertext secure en-
cryption [18,49,43,44,17], identity-based encryption [9,10,51,22,2] to symmetric authentication [52]. In fact,
besides a number of specific proofs, there seem to be only two generic techniques known to prove (Diffie-
Hellman and RSA-based) cryptographic protocols in the standard model: the partitioning trick as abstracted
in programmable hash functions and the recent dual system approach by Waters [64].
1.4 Short Signatures
Our main new applications of PHFs are short signatures in the standard model. We now discuss our results
in more detail. We refer to [15,11] for applications of short signatures.
The birthday paradox and randomized signatures. A signature scheme SIGFisch by Fischlin [33] (itself
a variant of the RSA-based Cramer-Shoup signatures [28]) is defined as follows. The signature for a message
3 We remark that the impossibility results from [30] do not imply that (m, 1)-programmable hash functions do not
exist since they only rule out the possibility of proving the security of FDH signatures based on any assump-
tion which is satisfied by random functions, thus it might still be possible to construct such objects using, say
homomorphic properties.
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m is given by sig := (e, r, (h0h
r
1h
m+r mod 2`
2 )
1/e mod N), where e is a random η-bit prime and r is a random
` bit mask. The birthday paradox (for uniformly sampled primes) tells us that after establishing q distinct
Fischlin signatures, the probability that there exist two signatures, (e, r1, y1) on m1 and (e, r2, y2) on m2, with
the same prime e is roughly q2η/2η. One can verify that in case of such a collision, (e, 2r1− r2, 2y1− y2) is a
valid signature on the “message” 2m1−m2 (with constant probability). Hence, from two Fischlin signatures
w.r.t. the same randomness e a signature can be computed (and hence the scheme can be broken). Usually,
for “k bit security” one requires the adversary’s success ratio (i.e., the forging probability of an adversary
divided by its running time) to be upper bounded by 2−k. For k = 80 and assuming the number of signature
queries is upper bounded by q = 230, the length of the prime must therefore be at least η > 80+60+8 = 148
bits to immunize against this birthday attack. We remark that for a different reason, Fischlin’ signatures
even require η ≥ 160 bits.
Beyond the birthday paradox. In fact, Fischlin’s signature scheme can be seen as our generic RSA
signatures scheme from (4), instantiated with a concrete (randomized) (1, 1)-PHF (RHF). In our notation,
the programmability of the hash function is used at the point where an adversary uses a given signature
(e, y1) to create a forgery (e, y) with the same prime e. A simulator in the security reduction has to be able
to compute y1 = H(X)
1/e but must use y = H(Z)1/e to break the strong RSA challenge, i.e., to compute
g1/e
′
and e′ > 1 from g. However, since the hash function is (1, 1)-programmable we can program H with g
and h = ge such that, with some non-negligible probability, H(X)1/e = hbX/e = gbX can be computed but
H(Z)1/e = (gaZhbZ )1/e = gaZ/egbZ can be used to break the strong RSA assumption since aZ 6= 0.
Our central improvement consists of instantiating the generic RSA signature scheme with an (m, 1)-
PHF to break the birthday bound. The observation is that such hash functions can guarantee that after
establishing up to m signatures with respect to the same prime, forging is still impossible. In analogy to the
above, with an (m, 1)-PHF the simulation is successful as long as there are at most m many signatures that
use the same prime as in the forgery. By the generalized birthday paradox we know that after establishing
q distinct generic RSA signatures the probability that there exists m signatures with the same prime is
roughly qm+1( η2η )
m. Again, the success ratio has to be bounded by 2−80 for q = 230 which means that
SIGRSA[H] instantiated with a (2, 1)-PRF can have primes as small as η = 80 bits to be provably secure.
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The security proof for the bilinear map scheme SIGBM[H] is similar. Due to the extended birthday paradox
(for uniform random strings), SIGBM[H] instantiated with a (2, 1)-PRF only needs η = 70 bits of randomness
to be provably secure.
Instantiations. Table 1 compares the signature sizes of our and known signatures assuming q = 230. For
RSA signatures our scheme SIGRSA[H
MG] offers a short alternative to Fischlin’s signature scheme. More
importantly, generating a random 80 bit prime will be considerably faster than a 160 bit one. Concretely,
since the complexity of finding a random η-bit prime with error 2−k is O(kη4) we expect that, compared
to the one by Fischlin, the signing algorithm of new scheme SIGRSA[H
MG] is roughly 16 times faster. Our
generic bilinear construction instantiated with the RPHF RHF explains the signature scheme by Fischlin [33];
instantiated with the the RPHF RHL it explains a variant of the schemes by Zhu [66,67]5 and Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya [21]. (Concretely, our variant uses a modified randomness space, see Appendix B for details.)
4 A remark in [33, Sec. 2.3] concerning a stateless signature variant that can be securely instantiated with η = 80
bit primes turned out incorrect. Concretely, [33]-signatures are of the form (e, α, y) and satisfy ye = xhα1 h
α⊕H(m)
2
for public h1, h2, x. In this, e is a 160-bit prime, and α ∈ {0, 1}160 is uniform. The remark in [33, Sec. 2.3] suggests
to instead use a signature (e, α, y) with ye = xhα1 h
α⊕H1(m)
2 h
α⊕H2(m)
3 for H(m) =: H1(M)||H2(M) and public
h1, h2, h3, x. This has the advantage that e and α can be chosen of size around 80 bits. It is claimed that the
security proof of the original scheme can be adapted to this variant. However, the proof crucially uses that there is
no collision among the e values used during the signing process, i.e., that no e occurs in more than one simulated
signature. With 160-bit primes e, such a collision will occur only with small probability; but with 80-bit primes e,
the probability will be in the order of 1/240.
5 The security proof given in [67] does not seem to be correct. Concretely, Zhu’s signatures are of the form (e, α, y)
and satisfy ye = h0h
α
1 h
H(m)
2 for public h0, h1, h2. In this, e is a random 2k-bit prime, and α ∈ {0, 1}` is uniform.
However, in the security proof of a Type I adversary (for which e = ej ∈ {e1, . . . , eq}), one needs to argue that
the simulated randomness αj is uniformly distributed in {0, 1}`. However, a close inspection of the used random
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Scheme Type Signature Size Key Size Efficiency
Boneh-Boyen [11] Bilinear |G|+ |Zp| =320 2|G| =320 1× Exp
Okamoto [57] (=SIGBM[RH
L]) Bilinear |G|+ |r|+ |s| =480 4|G| =640 1× Exp
Ours: SIGBM[H
MG] Bilinear |G|+ |s| =230 (`+ 2)|G| =26k 1× Exp
Hohenberger-Waters [45] RSA 2× |ZN | =2048 2× |ZN | =2048 160× P1024
Cramer-Shoup [28] RSA 2× |ZN |+ |e| =2208 3× |ZN |+ |e| =3232 1× P160
Fischlin [33] (=SIGRSA[RH
F]) RSA |ZN |+ |r|+ |e| =1344 4× |ZN | =4096 1× P160
Ours: SIGRSA[H
MG] RSA |ZN |+ |e| =1104 (`+ 1)|ZN | =164k 1× P80
Table 1. Recommended signature sizes of different schemes. The parameters are chosen to provide unforgeability with
k = 80 bits security after revealing maximal q = 230 signatures. RSA signatures are instantiated with a modulus of
|N | = 1024 bits, bilinear maps signatures in asymmetric pairings with |G| = log p = 160 bits. We assume without loss
of generality that messages are of size ` bits (otherwise, we can apply a collision-resistant hash function first), where
` must be in the order of 2k = 160 in order to provide k bits of security. The efficiency column counts the dominant
operations for signing. For Bilinear signatures this counts the number of exponentiations, for RSA signatures k× Pη
counts the number of random η-bit primes that need to be generated. We remark that the Hohenberger-Waters
scheme relies only on the (non-strong) RSA assumption but its computational cost is incomparably higher.
In our comparison, we have also included the recent scheme of Hohenberger and Waters [45]. Their scheme
has the benefit of relying only on the (non-strong) RSA assumption and having a compact verification key.
However, their scheme requires a large number of primality tests and exponentiations during signing and
verifying.
The main advantage of our bilinear maps scheme SIGBM[H
MG] is its very compact signatures of only
230 bits. This saves 90 bits compared to the short signatures scheme from Boneh-Boyen [11] and is only 70
bits larger than the random oracle BLS signatures. The signature scheme SIGBM[RH
L] is exactly the one
proposed by Okamoto [57] (which was implicitly introduced in a group signature scheme [35]).
An obvious drawback of our constructions is the size of the public verification key since it includes the
group hash key K. For example, for HMG : {0, 1}` → G, K contains `+ 1 group elements, where ` = 160. In
the bilinear case, that makes a verification key of 26k bits compared to 160 bits from [11]. While these short
signatures are mostly of theoretical interest and contribute to the problem of determining concrete bounds
on the size of standard-model signatures, we think that in certain applications even a large public-key is
tolerable. In particular, our public key sizes are still comparable to the ones of recently proposed lattice-based
signatures [54,38,22,17]. Furthermore, even for signatures in the random oracle model, sometimes a relatively
large verification key is necessary [31].
We remark that our concrete security reductions for the two generic schemes are not tight, i.e., the
reductions roughly lose log(q/δ) bits of security (cf. Theorems 10 and 13). Strictly speaking, a non-tight
reduction has to be penalized by having to choose a larger group order. Even though this is usually not
done in the literature [28,33], we also consider concrete signature size when additionally taking the non-tight
security reduction into account. A rigorous comparison will be done in Section 7.
Related Signature Schemes.Our generic bilinear map signature scheme belongs to the class of “inversion-
based” signature schemes originally proposed in [59] and first formally analyzed in [11]. The signature scheme
from [57] can be viewed as a special case of our generic bilinear map signature scheme instantiated with a ran-
domized PHF. Other related standard-model schemes can be found in [37,16]. We stress that our signatures
derive from the above since the message does not appear in the denominator of the exponent. Our generic
RSA signature scheme builds on the early work by Cramer and Shoup [28]. The signature schemes from
[33] and variants of [21,66,67] can be viewed as a special case of our generic bilinear map signature scheme
instantiated with a randomized PHF. Other standard-model RSA schemes are [36,20,26,56,40,29,48,60]. We
remark that security proofs for strong RSA based signature schemes are quite subtle and several variants
variables shows that this is not the case (given the view of the adversary). Our variant SIGRSA[RH
L], as well as the
scheme by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [21] use larger randomness space to make the simulation work.
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proposed in the literature contain flawed security proofs. As already explained in Footnote 4, a variant by
Fischlin [33, Sec. 2.3] cannot be proved secure. Furthermore, the proof of a scheme proposed by Zhu [66,67]
turned out to be incorrect (see Footnote 5) but a close variant with slightly larger randomness space (i.e.,
{0, 1}L with L = `+ k instead of L = `) can be proved secure using our framework.
1.5 Dedicated vs. Programmable Hash Functions
As argued before, random oracles [6] can be viewed as excellent programmable hash functions. For common
applications such as full-domain hash signatures or OAEP, one usually instantiates the random oracle with
a fixed, dedicated hash function (such as SHA1 [62]), Therefore, one may ask the question if such concrete
hash functions (when used as keyed hash functions) can serve as good programmable hash functions. More
concretely, is SHA1 an (m,n)-PRF for parameters m,n ≥ 1?
Even though it seems hard to actually disprove, our intuition says that this is very likely not the case.
In fact, one of the key design maxims of hash functions like SHA1 is to destroy all algebraic structure. In
contrast, the definition of programmable hash functions requires that there is a relation over an algebraic
structure. (I.e., we require that H(X) = gaXhbX over the group G.) In that sense programmable hash
functions formalize an obvious weakness in the random oracle methodology: security proofs making in the
random oracle model often use a property of the hash function that is commonly avoided by hash function’s
designers. Therefore, we do not recommend to use dedicated hash functions as a PHF.
1.6 Open problems
We show that PHFs provide a useful primitive to obtain black-box proofs for certain signature schemes. We
leave it for future research to extend the application of PHFs to other types of protocols. Another interesting
direction is to find instantiations of PHFs from different assumptions. For instance, the ideas in [22,2,17]
seem conceptually close to programmable hash functions in lattices.
We leave it as an open problem to prove or disprove the standard-model existence of (poly, 1)-PHFs.
(Note that a positive result would imply a security proof for FDH signatures like [7,15]). Moreover, we are
asking for a concrete construction of a bounded (m, 1)-PHF for m > 2.6 For example, a (3, 1)-PHF could be
used to shrink the signature size of SIGBM[H] to ≈ 215 bits; a bounded (5, 1)-PHF would make it possible to
shrink the size of the prime in SIGRSA[H] to roughly η = 60 bits and make signing roughly as efficient as RSA
full-domain hash7 (with the drawback of a larger public-key). Finally, a (2, 1) or (1, poly)-PHF with more
compact parameters would have dramatic impact on the practicability of our signature schemes or Waters’
IBE scheme [65].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
If x is a string, then |x| denotes its length, while if S is a set then |S| denotes its size. If k ∈ N then 1k
denotes the string of k ones. For n ∈ N, we write [n] shorthand for {1, . . . , n}. If S is a set then s $← S
denotes the operation of picking an element s of S uniformly at random. We write A(x, y, . . .) to indicate
that A is an algorithm with inputs x, y, . . . and by z $← A(x, y, . . .) we denote the operation of running A
with inputs (x, y, . . .) and letting z be the output. With PPT we denote probabilistic polynomial time. For
random variables X and Y , we write X
γ≡ Y if their statistical distance is at most γ.
6 We remark that an earlier version of this paper contained a generalization of RHF to a randomized (m, 1)-PHF for
any m ≥ 2. However, for our applications it did not turn out to be useful. Since for m ≥ 2 it is not sufficiently
bounded (it is only 2`m-bounded), it does not lead to more efficient RSA-based signatures. In the bilinear case,
the instantiations with this RPHF are all less efficient than Boneh-Boyen signatures.
7 For η ≈ 60 a full exponentiation modulo a 1024-bit integer become roughly as expensive as finding a random η-bit
prime.
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2.2 Digital signatures
A digital signature scheme SIG consists of three PPT algorithms. The key generation algorithm inputs a
security parameter (in unary representation) and generates a secret signing and a public verification key. The
signing algorithm inputs the signing key and a message and returns a signature. The deterministic verification
algorithm inputs the verification key and returns accept or reject. We demand the usual correctness property.
We recall the definition for unforgeability against chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA), played between a
challenger and a forger F :
1. On input of the security parameter k, the challenger generates verification/signing key, and gives the
verification key to F ;
2. F makes a number of signing queries to the challenger; each such query is a message mi; the challenger
signs mi, and sends the result sig i to F ;
3. F outputs a message m and a signature sig .
We say that forger F wins the game if sig is a valid signature on m and it has not queried a signature on m
before. Forger F (t, q, )-breaks the UF-CMA security of SIG if its running time is bounded by t, it makes
at most q signing queries, and the probability that it wins the above game is bounded by . Finally, SIG
is UF-CMA secure if no forger can (t, q, )-break the UF-CMA security of SIG for polynomial t and q and
non-negligible  (in the security parameter k).
2.3 Pairing groups and the q-SDH assumption
Our pairing schemes will be defined on families of bilinear groups (PGk)k∈N. A pairing group PG = PGk =
(G,GT , p, eˆ, g) consist of a multiplicative cyclic group G of prime order p, where 2k < p < 2k+1, a mul-
tiplicative cyclic group GT of the same order, a generator g ∈ G, and a non-degenerate bilinear pairing
eˆ: G × G → GT . See [11] for a description of the properties of such pairings. We say an adversary A
(t, )-breaks the q-strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumption if its running time is bounded by t and
Pr[(s, g
1
x+s )
$← A(g, gx, . . . , gxq )] ≥ ,
where g is a uniform generator of G and x $← Z∗p. We require that in PG the q-SDH [11] assumption holds
meaning that no adversary can (t, ) break the q-SDH problem for a polynomial t and non-negligible .
2.4 RSA groups and the strong RSA assumption
Our RSA schemes will be defined on families of RSA groups (RGk)k∈N. A safe RSA group RG = RGk = (P,Q)
consists of two distinct safe primes P and Q of k/2 bits. (A safe prime is a prime number of the form 2P ′+1,
where P ′ is also a prime.) In our later constructions, we will also use QRN , the cyclic group of quadratic
residues modulo an RSA number N = pq.
We say an adversary A (t, )-breaks the strong RSA assumption if its running time is bounded by t and
Pr[(e > 1, z1/e)
$← A(N = PQ, z)] ≥ ,
where z
$← ZN . We require that in RG the strong RSA assumption [3,34] holds meaning that no adversary
can (t, )-break the strong RSA problem for a polynomial t and non-negligible .
3 Programmable Hash Functions
3.1 Definitions
A group family G = (Gk) is a family of cyclic groups Gk, indexed by the security parameter k ∈ N. When the
reference to the security parameter k is clear, we will simply write G instead of Gk. A group hash function
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H = (PHF.Gen,PHF.Eval) for a group family G = (Gk) and with input length ` = `(k) consists of two
PPT algorithms. For security parameter k ∈ N, a key K $← PHF.Gen(1k) is generated by the key generation
algorithm PHF.Gen. This key K can then be used for the deterministic evaluation algorithm PHF.Eval to
evaluate H via y ← PHF.Eval(K,X) ∈ G for any X ∈ {0, 1}`. We write HK(X) = PHF.Eval(K,X).
Definition 1. A group hash function H is an (m,n, γ, δ)-programmable hash function if there are PPT al-
gorithms PHF.TrapGen (the trapdoor key generation algorithm) and PHF.TrapEval (the deterministic trapdoor
evaluation algorithm) such that the following holds:
Syntactics: For g, h ∈ G, the trapdoor key generation (K ′, t) $← PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) produces a key K ′
along with a trapdoor t. Moreover, (aX , bX)← PHF.TrapEval(t,X) produces integers aX and bX for any
X ∈ {0, 1}`.
Correctness: We demand HK′(X) = PHF.Eval(K
′, X) = gaXhbX for all generators g, h ∈ G and all possible
(K ′, t) $← PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h), for all X ∈ {0, 1}` and the corresponding (aX , bX)← PHF.TrapEval(t,X).
Statistically close trapdoor keys: For all generators g, h ∈ G and for K $← PHF.Gen(1k) and (K ′, t) $←
PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h), the keys K and K ′ are statistically γ-close: K
γ≡ K ′.
Well-distributed logarithms: For all generators g, h ∈ G and all possible K ′ in the range of (the first
component of) PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h), for all X1, . . . , Xm, Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ {0, 1}` such that Xi 6= Zj for any
i, j, and for the corresponding (aXi , bXi) ← PHF.TrapEval(t,Xi) and (aZi , bZi) ← PHF.TrapEval(t, Zi),
we have
Pr [aX1 = . . . = aXm = 0 ∧ aZ1 , . . . , aZn 6= 0] ≥ δ, (5)
where the probability is over the trapdoor t that was produced along with K ′.
We simply say that H is an (m,n)-programmable hash function if there is a negligible γ and a noticeable
δ such that H is (m,n, γ, δ)-programmable. Furthermore, we call H (poly, n)-programmable if H is (q, n)-
programmable for every polynomial q = q(k). We say that H is (m, poly)-programmable (resp. (poly, poly)-
programmable) if the obvious holds.
We remark that the requirement of the statistically close trapdoor keys is somewhat reminiscent to the
concept of “lossy trapdoor functions” [58]. Note that a group hash function can be a (m,n)-programmable
hash function for different parameters m,n with different trapdoor key generation and trapdoor evaluation
algorithms.
In our RSA application, the following additional definition will prove useful:
Definition 2. In the situation of Definition 1, we say that H is β-bounded (m,n, γ, δ)-programmable if
|aX | ≤ β(k) always.
3.2 Instantiations
As a first example, note that a (programmable) random oracle O (i.e., a random oracle which we can
completely control during a proof) is trivially a (c, poly) or (poly, c)-programmable hash function, for any
constant c > 0: given generators g and h, we simply define the values O(Xi) and O(Zj) in dependence of
the Xi and Zj as suitable expressions g
ahb. (For example, by using Coron’s method [27]: the random oracle
on some input X is defined to be as O(X) := g∆X ·a˜X · h(1−∆X)b˜X , where ∆X is a random biased coin with
Pr[∆X = 1] := 1/(2q(k)) and a˜X and b˜X are uniform values from Z|G|. Then (5) is fulfilled with probability
(1− 1/(2q(k)))q(k) · (1/(2q(k)))c ≥ 1/(4q(k))c, meaning O is a (poly, c)-programmable hash function.)
We will now give an example of a programmable hash function in the standard model.
Definition 3 (Multi-Generator PHF). Let G = (Gk) be a group family, and let ` = `(k) be a polynomial.
Then, HMG = (PHF.Gen,PHF.Eval) is the following group hash function:
– PHF.Gen(1k) returns a uniformly and independently sampled K = (h0, . . . , h`) ∈ G`+1.
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– PHF.Eval(K,X) parses K = (h0, . . . , h`) ∈ G`+1 and X = (x1, . . . , x`) ∈ {0, 1}` computes and returns
HMGK (X) = h0
∏`
i=1
hxii
Essentially this function was already used, with an objective similar to ours in mind, in a construction
from [65]. Here we provide a new use case and a useful abstraction of this function; also, we shed light on
the properties of this function from different angles (i.e., for different values of m and n). In [65], it was
implicitly proved that HMG is a (1, poly)-PHF:
Theorem 4. For any fixed polynomial q = q(k) and group G with known order, the function HMG is a
(1, q)-programmable hash function with γ = 0 and δ = 1/8(`+ 1)q.
The proof builds upon the fact that m = 1 and does not scale in the m-component. With a completely
different analysis, we can show that
Theorem 5. For any group G with known order, the function HMG is a (2, 1)-programmable hash function
with γ = 0 and δ = Θ(1/`).
Proof. We give only the intuition here and postpone the full (and somewhat technical) proof to Appendix A.1.
Consider the following algorithms:
– PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) sets a0 = −1 and chooses uniformly and independently a1, . . . , a` ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and
random group exponents8 b0, . . . , b`. It sets hi = g
aihbi for 0 ≤ i ≤ ` and returns K = (h0, . . . , h`) and
t = (a0, b0, . . . , a`, b`).
– PHF.TrapEval(t,X) parses X = (x1, . . . , x`) ∈ {0, 1}` and returns a = a0 +
∑`
i=1 aixi and b = b0 +∑`
i=1 bixi.
It is clear that this fulfills the syntactic and correctness requirements of Definition 1. Also, since the bi are
chosen independently and uniformly, so are the hi, and the trapdoor keys indistinguishability requirement
follows. It is more challenging to prove (5) (for m = 2, n = 1), i.e., that for all strings X1, X2 and Z1 6∈
{X1, X2}, we have that
Pr [aX1 = aX2 = 0 ∧ aZ1 6= 0] = Θ(1/`) . (6)
We will only give an intuition here. First, note that the X1, X2, Z1 are independent of the ai, since they
are masked by the bi in hi = g
aihbi . If we view X1 as a subset of [`] (where we define i ∈ X1 iff the i-th
component x1i of X1 is 1), then the value
aX1 = a0 +
∑`
i=1
aix1i = −1 +
∑
i∈X1
ai
essentially9 constitutes a random walk of length |X1| + 1 ≤ ` + 1. Theory says that it is likely that this
random walk ends up with an aX1 of small absolute value. That is, for any d with |d| = O(
√
`), the
probability that aX1 = d is Θ(1/
√
`). In particular, the probability for aX1 = 0 is Θ(1/
√
`). Now if X1 and
X2 were disjoint and there was no a0 in the sum, then aX1 and aX2 would be independent and we would get
that aX1 = aX2 = 0 with probability Θ(1/`). But even if X1 ∩X2 6= ∅, and taking into account a0, we can
conclude similarly by lower bounding the probability that aX1\X2 = aX2\X1 = −aX1∩X2 .
The additional requirement from (6) that aZ1 6= 0 is intuitively much more obvious, but also much harder
to formally prove. First, without loss of generality, we can assume that Z1 ⊆ X1 ∪X2, since otherwise, there
is a “partial random walk” aZ1\(X1∪X2) that contributes to aZ1 but is independent of aX1 and aX2 . Hence,
8 If |G| is not known, this may only be possible approximately.
9 Usually, random walks are formalized as a sum of independent values ai ∈ {−1, 1}; for us, it is more convenient to
assume ai ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. However, this does not change things significantly.
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even when already assuming aX1 = aX2 = 0, aZ1 still is sufficiently randomized to take a non-zero value with
constant probability. Also, we can assume Z1 not to “split” X1 in the sense that Z1∩X1 ∈ {∅, X1} (similarly
for X2). Otherwise, even assuming a fixed value of aX1 , there is still some uncertainty about aZ1∩X1 and
hence about aZ1 (in which case with some probability, aZ1 does not equal any fixed value). The remaining
cases can be handled with a similar “no-splitting” argument. However, note that the fixed “a0 = −1” in
the g-exponent of h0 is essential: without it, picking X1 and X2 disjoint and setting Z1 = X1 ∪X2 achieves
aZ1 = aX1 + aX2 = 0. A full proof is given in Appendix A.1.
Using techniques from the proof of Theorem 5, we can asymptotically improve the bounds from Theorem 4
as follows (a proof can be found in Appendix A):
Theorem 6. For any fixed polynomial q = q(k) and group G with known order, the function HMG is a
(1, q)-programmable hash function with γ = 0 and δ = O( 1
q
√
`
).
One may wonder whether the scalability of HMG with respect to m reaches further. Unfortunately, it does
not (the proof is in Appendix A):
Theorem 7. Assume ` = `(k) ≥ 2. Say |G| is known and prime, and the discrete logarithm problem in G
is hard. Then HMG is not (3, 1)-programmable.
If the group order G is not known (as will be the case in our upcoming RSA-based signature scheme),
then it may not even be possible to sample group exponents uniformly. However, for the special case where
G = QRN is the group of quadratic residues modulo N = pq for safe distinct primes p and q, we can
approximate a uniform exponent with a random element from ZN2 . (See, e.g., [28].) In this case, the statistical
distance between keys produced by PHF.Gen and those produced by PHF.TrapGen is smaller than (`+ 1)/N .
We get the following theorem.
Theorem 8. For the group G = QRN of quadratic residues modulo N = pq for safe distinct primes p and
q, the function HMG is O(q`)-bounded (1, q, (` + 1)/N, 1/8(` + 1)q)-programmable as well as O(`)-bounded
(2, 1, (`+ 1)/N,O(1/`))-programmable.
As is to be expected, one can show that also in case G = QRN , the function HMG is not (3, 1)-
programmable.
3.3 Randomized Programmable Hash Functions (RPHFs)
In Appendix B we further generalize the notion of PHFs to randomized programmable hash functions
(RPHFs). Briefly, RPHFs are PHFs whose evaluation is randomized, and where this randomness is added
to the image (so that verification is possible). We show how to adapt the PHF definition to the randomized
case, in a way suitable for the upcoming applications. We also give instantiations of RPHFs for parameters
for which we do not know how to instantiate PHFs.
4 Basic applications of PHFs
4.1 Collision resistant hashing
As a warm-up, we can show the natural result that any (non-trivially) programmable hash function is
collision-resistant.
Theorem 9. Assume |G| is known and prime, and the discrete logarithm problem in G is hard. Let H be a
(1, 1)-programmable hash function. Then H is collision-resistant.
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Proof. Fix PPT algorithms PHF.TrapGen and PHF.TrapEval. To show H’s collision-resistance, assume an
adversary A that outputs a collision with non-negligible probability with keys K $← PHF.Gen(1k). Now by
the key closeness of Definition 1, A will also do so with keys K ′ from (K ′, t) $← PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h), for
any g, h. Any collision HK′(X) = HK′(X
′) with X 6= X ′ gives rise to an equation
gahb = HK′(X) = HK′(X
′) = ga
′
hb
′
,
where (a, b) ← PHF.TrapEval(t,X) and (a′, b′) ← PHF.TrapEval(t,X ′). (5) states that with non-negligible
probability, we have a = 0 and a′ 6= 0, in which case we can compute dlogh(g) = (b− b′)/a′ mod |G|.
Similarly (using Lemma 14), one can show that for a PHF for G = QRN , (1, 1)-programmability implies
collision-resistance under the strong RSA assumption. We omit the details.
4.2 Other applications
As already discussed in the introduction, PHFs have other applications.
– A (poly, 1)-PHF is sufficient to instantiate the hash function used in full-domain hash signatures like BLS
signatures or RSA-FDH. A fair number of other protocols (e.g., the Boneh/Frankin IBE scheme [13]) are
based on the same “full-domain hash” properties of the hash function. Unfortunately, we do not know if
(poly, 1)-PHFs do exist, or not. Similarly, a (m, 1)-PHF is sufficient to instantiate the hash function used
in full-domain hash signatures like BLS signatures or RSA-FDH and show that they are secure m-time
signatures.
– A (1, poly)-PHF is sufficient to instantiate the “hash function” used in Waters’ IBE and signature
scheme [65]. In fact, the (1, poly)-PHF HMG is the original hash function Waters used in his IBE scheme.
Our new bound from Theorem 6 can be used to improve the bound in the security reduction of Waters’
IBE and signature scheme. We expect that the same improvements can be achieved for schemes based
on Waters’ IBE, e.g., [1,5,18,50,53].
5 Generic signatures from Bilinear Maps
5.1 Construction
Let PG = (G,GT , p = |G|, g, eˆ : G × G → GT ) be a pairing group. Let n = n(k) and η = η(k) be two
arbitrary polynomials. Our signature scheme signs messages m ∈ {0, 1}n using randomness s ∈ {0, 1}η.10
Let a group hash function H = (PHF.Gen,PHF.Eval) with inputs from {0, 1}n and outputs from G be given.
We are ready to define our generic bilinear map signature scheme SIGBM[H].
Key-Generation: Generate PG such that H can be used for the group G. Generate a key for H via
K
$← PHF.Gen(1k). Pick a random index x ∈ Z∗p and compute X = gx ∈ G. Return the public verification
key (PG, X,K) and the secret signing key x.
Signing: To sign m ∈ {0, 1}n, pick a random η-bit integer s and compute y = HK(m) 1x+s ∈ G. The signature
is the tuple (s, y) ∈ {0, 1}η ×G.
Verification: To verify that (s, y) ∈ {0, 1}η ×G is a correct signature on a given message m, check that s
is of length η, and that
eˆ(y,X · gs) = eˆ(HK(m), g).
10 For signing arbitrary bitstrings, a collision resistant hash function CR : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n can be applied first. Due
to the birthday paradox we choose n = 2k when k bits of security are actually desired.
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Theorem 10. Let H be an (m, 1, γ, δ)-programmable hash function. Let F be a (t, q, )-forger in the existen-
tial forgery under an adaptive chosen message attack experiment with SIGBM. Then there exists an adversary
A that (t′, ′)-breaks the q-SDH assumption with t′ ≈ t and
 ≤ q
δ
· ′ + q
m+1
2mη
+
q
p
+ γ .
We remark that the scheme can also be instantiated in asymmetric pairing groups where the pairing is
given by eˆ : G1 ×G2 → GT and G1 6= G2. We use MNT curves [55] such that the element y ∈ G1 from the
signature can be represented in 160 bits. (See [11] for more details.) Also, in asymmetric pairings, verification
can equivalently check if eˆ(y,X) = eˆ(HK(m) · y−1/s, g). This way we avoid any expensive exponentiation in
G2 and verification time becomes roughly the same as in the Boneh-Boyen short signatures [11]. It can be
verified that the following proof also holds in asymmetric pairing groups. (Note that the security assumption
also has to be adapted to symmetric q-SDH assumption which is given g1, g
x
1 , . . . , g
(xq)
1 , g2, g
x
2 , it is hard to
find a pair (c, g
1/(x+c)
1 ).)
An efficiency comparison of the scheme instantiated with the (2, 1)-PHF HMG from Definition 3 is done
in Section 7.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 10
Let F be the adversary against the signature scheme. Throughout this proof, we assume that H is a
(m, 1, γ, δ)-programmable hash function. Furthermore, we fix some notation. Let mi be the i-th query to the
signing oracle and (si, yi) denote the answer. Let m and (s, y) be the forgery output by the adversary. We
introduce two types of forgers:
Type I: It always holds that s = si for some i.
Type II: It always holds that s 6= si for all i.
By F1 (resp., F2) we denote the forger who runs F but then only outputs the forgery if it is of type I (resp.,
type II). We now show that both types of forgers can be reduced to the (q + 1)-SDH problem. Theorem 10
then follows by a standard hybrid argument.
Both reductions rely on a trick from [11] that given a q-SDH instance g˜, g˜x, . . . , g˜x
q
, one can efficiently
compute g, gx, together with q random solved instances (g1/(x+si), si). A new instance of the form (g
1/(x+s), s)
for s 6∈ {s1, . . . , sq}, however, can be used to break the q-SDH assumption. For Type II forgers this idea
can be applied more or less directly. For Type I forgers it may happen that there is a m-collision in the
simulated randomness, i.e, we have s = si1 = . . . sim , and one has to use the properties of the (m, 1)-PHF to
be able to simulate the maximal m signatures of the form (H(mij )
1/(x+s), s), while using the forger’s output
H(m)1/(x+s) to break the q-SDH assumption.
Type I forgers
Lemma 11. Let F1 be a forger of type I that (t1, q, 1)-breaks the existential unforgeability of SIGBM[H].
Then there exists an adversary A that (t′, ′)-breaks the q-SDH assumption with t′ ≈ t and
′ ≥ δ
q
(
1 − q
m+1
2mη
− q
p
− γ
)
.
To prove the lemma we proceed in games. In the following, Xi denotes the probability for the adversary
to successfully forge a signature in Game i.
Game 0. Let F1 be a type I forger that (t1, q, 1)-breaks the existential unforgeability of SIGBM[H]. By
definition, we have
Pr [X0] = 1. (7)
12
Game 1. We now use the trapdoor key generation (K ′, t) $← PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) for uniformly selected
generators g, h ∈ G to generate a H-key for public verification key of SIGBM[H]. By the programmability of
H,
Pr [X1] ≥ Pr [X0]− γ. (8)
Game 2. Now we select the random values si used for answering signing queries not upon each signing
query, but at the beginning of the experiment. Since the si were selected independently anyway, this change
is only conceptual. Let E =
⋃q
i=1{si} be the set of all si, and let Ei = E \ {si}. We also change the
selection of the elements g, h used during (K ′, t) $← PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) as follows. First, we uniformly
choose i∗ ∈ [q] and a generator g˜ ∈ G. Define E∗ = E \ {si∗} and E∗,i = E∗ \ {si}. Further, define the
polynomials p∗(η) =
∏
t∈E∗(η + t) and p(η) =
∏
t∈E(η + t) and note that deg(p
∗) ≤ q − 1 and deg(p) ≤ q.
Hence the values g = g˜p
∗(x), h = g˜p(x), and X = gx = g˜xp
∗(x) can be computed from g˜, g˜x, . . . , g˜x
q
. Here the
index x ∈ Z∗|G| is the secret key of the scheme. We then set
g = g˜p
∗(x) = g˜
∏
t∈E∗ (x+t), h = g˜p(x) = g˜
∏
t∈E(x+t).
Note that we can compute (x+si)-th roots for i 6= i∗ from g and for all i from h. Unless we are in the unlucky
case that g or h are not generators (which can only happens if p(x) = 0) this change is purely conceptual:
Pr [X2] ≥ Pr [X1]− q
p
. (9)
Observe also that i∗ is independent of the adversary’s view.
Game 3. In this game, we change the way signature requests from the adversary are answered. First, observe
that the way we modified the generation of g and h in Game 2 implies that for any i with si 6= si∗ , we have
yi = HK′(mi)
1
x+si =
(
gamihbmi
) 1
x+si
=
(
g˜ami
∏
t∈E∗ (x+t)g˜bmi
∏
t∈E(x+t)
) 1
x+si
= g˜ami
∏
t∈E∗,i (x+t)g˜bmi
∏
t∈Ei (x+t) (10)
for (ami , bmi) ← PHF.TrapEval(t,mi). Hence for i 6= i∗, we can generate the signature (si, yi) without
explicitly knowing the secret key x, but instead using the right-hand side of (10) for computing yi. Obviously,
this change in computing signatures is only conceptual, and so
Pr [X3] = Pr [X2] . (11)
Observe that i∗ is still independent of the adversary’s view.
Game 4. We now abort and raise event abortcoll if an si occurs more than m times, i.e., if there are pairwise
distinct indices i1, . . . , im+1 with si1 = . . . = sim+1 . There are
(
q
m+1
)
such tuples (i1, . . . , im). For each tuple,
the probability for si1 = . . . = sim+1 is 1/2
mη A union bound shows that an (m + 1)-wise collision occurs
with probability at most
Pr [abortcoll] ≤
(
q
m+ 1
)
1
2mη
≤ q
m+1
2mη
.
Hence,
Pr [X4] ≥ Pr [X3]− Pr [abortcoll] > Pr [X3]− q
m+1
2mη
. (12)
Game 5. We now abort and raise event abortbad.s if the adversary returns an s ∈ E∗, i.e., the adversary
returns a forgery attempt (s, y) with s = si for some i, but s 6= si∗ . Since i∗ is independent from the
adversary’s view, we have Pr [abortbad.s] ≤ 1− 1/q for any choice of the si, so we get
Pr [X5] = Pr [X4 ∧ ¬abortbad.s] ≥ 1
q
Pr [X4] . (13)
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Game 6. We now abort and raise event abortbad.a if there is an index i with si = si∗ but ami 6= 0, or if
am = 0 for the adversary’s forgery message. In other words, we raise abortbad.a iff we do not have ami = 0
for all i with si = si∗ and am 6= 0. Since we have limited the number of such i to m in Game 4, we can use
the programmability of H. We hence have Pr [abortbad.a] ≤ 1− δ for any choice of the mi and si, so we get
Pr [X6] ≥ Pr [X5 ∧ ¬abortbad.a] ≥ δ · Pr [X5] . (14)
Note that in Game 6, the experiment never really uses secret key x to generate signatures: to generate the
yi for si 6= si∗ , we already use (10), which requires no x. But if abortbad.a does not occur, then ami = 0
whenever si = si∗ , so we can also use (10) to sign without knowing x. On the other hand, if abortbad.a does
occur, we must abort anyway, so actually no signature is required.
This means that Game 6 does not use knowledge about the secret key x. On the other hand, the adversary
in Game 6 produces (whenever X6 happens, which implies ¬abortbad.a and ¬abortbad.s) during a forgery
y = HK′(m)
1/(x+s) =
(
g˜am
∏
t∈E∗ (x+t)g˜bm
∏
t∈E(x+t)
) 1
x+s
= g˜
amp
∗(x)
x+s g˜bmp
∗(x).
From y and its knowledge about h and the si, the experiment can derive
y′ =
(
y
gp∗(x)bm
)1/am
= g˜
p∗(x)
x+s .
Since gcd(η+s, p∗(η)) = 1 (where we interpret η+s and p∗(η) as polynomials in η), we can write p∗(η)/(η+
s) = p′(η) + q0/(η + s) for some polynomial p′(η) of degree at most q − 2 and some q0 6= 0. Again, we can
compute g′ = g˜p
′(x). We finally obtain
y′′ = (y′/g′)1/q0 =
(
g˜
p∗(x)
(x+s)
−p′(x)
)1/q0
= g˜
1
x+s .
This means that the from the experiment performed in Game 6, we can construct an adversary A that (t′, ′)-
breaks the q-SDH assumption. A’s running time t′ is approximately t plus a small number of exponentiations,
and A is successful whenever X6 happens:
′ ≥ Pr [X6] . (15)
Putting (7-15) together yields Lemma 11.
Type II forgers
Lemma 12. Let F2 be a forger of type II that (t2, q, 2)-breaks the existential unforgeability of SIGBM[H].
Then there exists an adversary A that (t′, ′)-breaks the q-SDH assumption and an adversary A∗ that (t′′, ′′)-
breaks the discrete logarithm problem in G such that t′, t′′ ≈ t2 and
′ + ′′ ≥ δ · (2 − γ) .
Note that the discrete logarithm problem is at least as hard as the q-SDH problem, so for Theorem 10, we
can assume ′ ≥ ′′ without loss of generality.
For the proof, we again proceed in games. The proof is very similar to the proof for type I forgers, so we
will be brief where similarities occur.
Game 0. Let F2 be a type II forger that (t2, q, 2)-breaks the existential unforgeability of SIGBM[H]. By
definition, we have
Pr [X0] = 2. (16)
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Game 1. We now use the trapdoor key generation (K ′, t) $← PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) for uniformly selected
generators g, h ∈ G to generate a H-key for the public verification key of SIGBM[H]. By the programmability
of H,
Pr [X1] ≥ Pr [X0]− γ. (17)
Game 2. Now we select the used randomness si used for answering signing queries at the beginning of the
experiment and set E =
⋃q
i=1{si}. We select the elements g, h passed to PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) as follows:
We uniformly choose a generator g˜ ∈ G. Define the polynomial p(η) = ∏t∈E(η+ t) and note that deg(p) ≤ q.
Hence the values g = g˜p(x) and X = gx = g˜xp(x) can be computed from g˜, g˜x, . . . , g˜x
q+1
. We choose c ∈ Z|G|
uniformly and set
g = g˜p(x), h = g˜cp(x).
Note that we can compute (x+ si)-th roots from g and h for all i. These change is purely conceptual:
Pr [X2] = Pr [X1] . (18)
Game 3. We answer all signature requests from the adversary as in Game 3 of the proof of Lemma 11. That
is, we use the way that g and h are chosen to avoid having to compute the (x + si)th root. This change is
only conceptual, and we have
Pr [X3] = Pr [X2] . (19)
Game 4. We now abort and raise event abortlog if am+c·bm = 0 mod |G| for the adversary’s forged message
m. Since we chose c as a uniform exponent and only pass g and h = gc (but no further information about c)
to adversary and PHF.TrapGen, these algorithms break a discrete logarithm problem. In particular, we can
construct a suitable (t′′, ′′)-attacker A∗ on the discrete logarithm problem in G that takes gc as input and
computes c = −am/bm mod |G|. This adversary achieves
Pr [X4] ≥ Pr [X3 ∧ ¬abortlog] ≥ Pr [X3]− ′′. (20)
Game 5. We now abort and raise event abortbad.a if am (obtained from PHF.TrapEval(t,m)) is zero for the
adversary’s forgery message m. The programmability of H directly implies
Pr [X5] ≥ Pr [X4 ∧ ¬abortbad.a] ≥ δ · Pr [X4] . (21)
Now from Game 5, we can now construct an adversary A on the (q+ 1)-SDH assumption. A takes inputs
g˜, g˜x, . . . , g˜x
q+1
and simulates Game 5 with adversary F2. A uses its inputs as if it was selected by the
experiment; note that in Game 5, the secret key x is not used anymore. Now whenever F2 outputs a forgery
y with
y =
(
gamhbm
) 1
x+s =
(
g˜(am+c·bm)
∏
t∈E(x+t)
) 1
x+s
.
Since we have am+ c · bm 6= 0 mod |G|, we can compute a nontrivial root of the challenge g˜. Therefore, from
y′ = y
1
cam+dbm = g˜
p(x)
x+s
one can compute g˜1/(x+s), like in the proof of Lemma 11. Putting (16-21) together (and using that δ ≤ 1)
yields Lemma 12.
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6 Generic signatures from RSA
6.1 Construction
Let G = QRN be the group of quadratic residues modulo an RSA number N = PQ, where P and Q are safe
primes. Let n = n(k) and η = η(k) be two polynomials. Let a group hash function H = (PHF.Gen,PHF.Eval)
with inputs from {0, 1}n and outputs from G be given. We are ready to define our generic RSA-based
signature scheme SIGRSA[H]:
Key-Generation: Generate N = PQ for safe distinct primes P,Q ≥ 2η+2, such that H can be used for the
group G = QRN . K
$← PHF.Gen(1k). Return the public verification key (N,K) and the secret signing
key (P,Q).
Signing: To sign m ∈ {0, 1}n, pick a random η-bit prime e and compute y = HK(m)1/e mod N. The e-th
root can be computed using P and Q. The signature is the tuple (e, y) ∈ {0, 1}η × ZN .
Verification: To verify that (e, y) ∈ {0, 1}η × ZN is a correct signature on a given message m, check that
e is odd and of length η, and that ye = H(m) mod N . It is not necessary to check specifically that e is a
prime.
Theorem 13. Let H be a β-bounded (m, 1, γ, δ)-programmable hash function for bound β ≤ 2η and m ≥ 1.
Let F be a (t, q, )-forger in the existential forgery under an adaptive chosen message attack experiment with
SIGRSA[H]. Then there exists an adversary A that (t′, ′)-breaks the strong RSA assumption with t′ ≈ t and
 = Θ
(q
δ
′
)
+
qm+1(η + 1)m
2mη−1
+ γ .
The proof is similar to the case of bilinear maps (Theorem 10).
Let us again consider the instantiation SIGRSA[H
MG] for the (2, 1)-PHF HMG. Plugging in the values
from Theorem 8 the reduction from Theorem 13 leads to  = Θ(q`′) + q
3(η+1)2
22η−1 . As explained in the
introduction, for q = 230 and k = 80 bits we are now able to choose η ≈ 80 bit primes.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 13
We first state the following simple lemma due to [41].
Lemma 14. Given x, z ∈ Z∗n, along with a, b ∈ Z, such that xa = zb, one can efficiently compute x˜ ∈ Z∗n
such that x˜ = z
gcd(a,b)
a .
To prove this lemma one can use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute integers f, g such that
bf + ag = gcd(a, b). One can check that x˜ := xfzg satisfies the above equation.
Now let F be the adversary against the signature scheme. Throughout this proof, we assume that H is
a (m, 1, γ, δ)-programmable hash function. Furthermore, we fix some notation. Let mi the ith query to the
signing oracle an (ei, yi) denote the answer. Let m and (e, y) be the forgery output by the adversary. We
introduce two types of forgers:
Type I: It always holds that e = ei for some i.
Type II: It always holds that e 6= ei for all i.
By F1 (resp., F2) we denote the forger who runs F but then only outputs the forgery if it is of type I (resp.,
type II). We now show that both types of forgers can be reduced to the strong RSA problem. Theorem 13
then follows by a standard hybrid argument.
Similar to the q-SDH case, both reductions rely on the standard trick [28] that given an RSA instance
N = pq and g˜ ∈ QRN , one can efficiently compute g ∈ QRN , together with q random solved instances
(g1/ei , ei), for random primes ei. A new instance of the form (g
1/e, e) for e 6∈ {e1, . . . , eq}, however, can be
used to break the strong RSA assumption. For Type II forgers this idea can be applied more or less directly.
For Type I forgers it may happen that there is a m-collision in the simulated random primes, i.e, we have
e = ei1 = . . . eim , and one has to use the properties of the (m, 1)-PHF to be able to simulate the maximal
m signatures of the form (H(mij )
1/e, e), while using the forger’s output H(m)1/e to break the strong RSA
assumption.
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Type I forgers
Lemma 15. Let F1 be a forger of type I that (t1, q, 1)-breaks the existential unforgeability of SIGRSA[H].
Then there exists an adversary A that (t′, ′)-breaks the strong RSA assumption with t′ ≈ t and
′ ≥ δ
q
·
(
1 − q
m+1(η + 1)m
2mη−1
− γ
)
.
To prove the lemma we proceed in games.
Game 0. Let F1 be a type I forger that (t1, q, 1)-breaks the existential unforgeability of SIGRSA[H]. By
definition, we have
Pr [X0] = 1. (22)
Game 1. We now use the trapdoor key generation (K ′, t) $← PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) for uniformly selected
generators g, h ∈ QRN to generate a H-key for the public verification key of SIGRSA[H]. By the programma-
bility of H,
Pr [X1] ≥ Pr [X0]− γ. (23)
Game 2. Now we select the used primes ei used for answering signing queries not upon each signing query,
but at the beginning of the experiment. Since the ei were selected independently anyway, this change is only
conceptual. Let E =
⋃q
i=1 ei be the set of all ei, and let E
i = E \ {i}. We also change the selection of the
elements g, h used during (K ′, t) $← PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) as follows. First, we uniformly choose i∗ ∈ [q] and
generators g˜ ∈ Z∗N , h˜ ∈ QRN . We then set E∗ = E \ {ei∗}, E∗,i = E∗ \ {ei}, and
g = g˜2
∏
x∈E∗ x, h = h˜
∏
x∈E x.
Note that we can extract an ei-th root for i 6= i∗ from g and for all i from h. Unless none of the ei divides
|G|, the induced distribution on g and h is the same as in Game 1. Since |G| = |QRN | = P ′Q′ for primes
P ′ = (P − 1)/2 and Q′ = (Q− 1)/2, and we assumed that P,Q ≥ 2η+2, however, we have that ei does not
divide |G| (for all i).
Pr [X2] = Pr [X1] . (24)
Observe also that i∗ is independent of the adversary’s view.
Game 3. In this game, we change the way signature requests from the adversary are answered. First, observe
that the way we modified the generation of g and h in Game 2 implies that for any i with ei 6= ei∗ , we have
that yi can be written as
HK′(mi)
1/ei =
(
gamihbmi
)1/ei
=
(
g˜2ami
∏
x∈E∗ xh˜bmi
∏
x∈E x
)1/ei
= g˜2ami
∏
x∈E∗,i xh˜bmi
∏
x∈Ei x.
for (ami , bmi)← PHF.TrapEval(t,mi). Hence for i 6= i∗, we can generate the signature (ei, yi) without explicit
exponent inversion, but instead using this alternative presentation of yi. Obviously, this change in computing
signatures is only conceptual, and so
Pr [X3] = Pr [X2] . (25)
Observe that i∗ is still independent of the adversary’s view.
Game 4. We now abort and raise event abortcoll if an ei occurs more than m times, i.e., if there are pairwise
distinct indices i1, . . . , im+1 with ei1 = . . . = eim+1 . There are
(
q
m+1
)
such tuples (i1, . . . , im). For each tuple,
the probability for ei1 = . . . = eim+1 is 1/Pm, where P denotes the number of primes11 of length η. Since
P > 2η/3(η+1) log 2 (see, e.g., [63, Theorem 5.7]), a union bound shows that an (m+1)-wise collision occurs
with probability at most
Pr [abortcoll] ≤
(
q
m+ 1
)(
3(η + 1) log 2
2η
)m
≤ q
m+1(η + 1)m
2mη
· (3 log 2)
m
(m+ 1)!
<
qm+1(η + 1)m
2mη−1
.
11 For simplicity, we assume a uniform distribution among all primes of length η.
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Hence,
Pr [X4] ≥ Pr [X3]− Pr [abortcoll] > Pr [X3]− q
m+1(η + 1)m
2mη−1
. (26)
Game 5. We now abort and raise event abortbad.e if the adversary returns an e ∈ E∗, i.e., the adversary
returns a forgery attempt (e, y) with e = ei for some i, but e 6= ei∗ . Since i∗ is independent from the
adversary’s view, we have Pr [abortbad.e] ≤ 1− 1/q for any choice of the ei, so we get
Pr [X5] = Pr [X4 ∧ ¬abortbad.e] ≥ 1
q
Pr [X4] . (27)
Game 6. We now abort and raise event abortbad.a if there is an index i with ei = ei∗ but ami 6= 0, or if
am = 0 for the adversary’s forgery message. In other words, we raise abortbad.a iff we do not have ami = 0
for all i with ei = ei∗ and am 6= 0. Since we have limited the number of such i to m in Game 4, we can use
the programmability of H. We hence have Pr [abortbad.a] ≤ 1− δ for any choice of the mi and ei, so we get
Pr [X6] ≥ Pr [X5 ∧ ¬abortbad.a] ≥ δ · Pr [X5] . (28)
Note that in Game 6, the experiment never really needs to invert exponents to generate signatures: to
generate the yi for ei 6= ei∗ , we already use the method of Game 3, which requires no inversion. But if
abortbad.a does not occur, then ami = 0 whenever ei = ei∗ , so we can also use that method to sign without
inversion. On the other hand, if abortbad.a does occur, we must abort anyway, so actually no signature is
required.
This means that Game 6 does not use knowledge about the factorization of N . On the other hand, the
adversary in Game 6 produces (whenever X6 happens, which implies ¬abortbad.a and ¬abortbad.e) during a
forgery
y = (HK′(m))
1/e
=
(
g˜2am
∏
x∈E∗ xh˜bm
∏
x∈E x
)1/e
= g˜
2am
∏
x∈E∗ x
e · h˜bm
∏
x∈E∗ x.
From y and its knowledge about h˜, and the ei, the experiment can derive
y′ =
y
h˜bm
∏
x∈E∗ x
= g˜
2am
∏
x∈E∗ x
e .
We have gcd(2am
∏
x∈E∗ x, e) = 1 because e is larger than |am| by H’s boundedness, so that Lemma 14 finally
allows to obtain y′′ = g˜1/e. Since g˜ was chosen initially independently and uniformly from Z∗N , this means
that the from the experiment performed in Game 6, we can construct an adversary A that (t′, ′)-breaks the
strong RSA assumption. A’s running time t′ is approximately t plus a small number of exponentiations, and
A is successful whenever X6 happens:
′ ≥ Pr [X6] . (29)
Putting (22-29) together yields Lemma 15.
Type II forgers
Lemma 16. Let F2 be a forger of type II that (t1, q, 1)-breaks the existential unforgeability of SIGRSA[H].
Then there exists an adversary A that (t′, ′)-breaks the strong RSA assumption with t′ ≈ t and
′ ≥ δ
2
· (2 − γ) .
Again we proceed in games. The proof is very similar to the proof for type I forgers, so we will be brief
where similarities occur.
Game 0. Let F2 be a type II forger that (t2, q, 2)-breaks the existential unforgeability of SIGRSA[H]. By
definition, we have
Pr [X0] = 2. (30)
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Game 1. We now use the trapdoor key generation (K ′, t) $← PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) for uniformly selected
generators g, h ∈ QRN to generate a H-key for public verification key of SIGRSA[H]. By the programmability
of H,
Pr [X1] ≥ Pr [X0]− γ. (31)
Game 2. Now we select the used primes ei used for answering signing queries at the beginning of the
experiment and set E =
⋃q
i=1 ei. We select the elements g, h passed to PHF.TrapGen(1
k, g, h) as follows: we
choose g˜ ∈ Z∗N and c ∈ ZN2 uniformly and set
g = g˜2
∏
x∈E x, h = gc = g˜2c
∏
x∈E x.
Note that we can extract an ei-th root from g and h for all i. These change is purely conceptual:
Pr [X2] = Pr [X1] . (32)
Game 3. We answer all signature requests from the adversary as in Game 3 of the proof of Lemma 15.
That is, we use the way that g and h are chosen to avoid having to invert exponents. This change is only
conceptual, and we have
Pr [X3] = Pr [X2] . (33)
Game 4. We now abort and raise event abortbad.e if e divides am + c · bm over the integers. Recall that
|G| = |QRN | = p′q′ for primes p′, q′ with N = (2p′ + 1)(2q′ + 1). Recall also that c is chosen uniformly
from ZN2 , so we can write c = c1 + c2|G| with 0 ≤ c1 < |G|. Note that c2 is statistically 1/N -close to being
uniformly distributed over {0, . . . , bN2−1p′q′ c} and independent of c1. However, the only information about c
released to the adversary and the PHF.TrapGen algorithm is h = gc and hence c1 = c mod |G|.
We would like to find necessary conditions for abortbad.e. To this end, let d = gcd(bm, e). We first claim
that for abortbad.e, it is necessary that d 6= e. For contradiction, assume d = e. Then e|bm by definition of d.
Since |am| < e by H’s boundedness, we also have e 6 |am + c · bm. Taken together this implies that e does not
divide am + c · bm, and hence we have ¬abortbad.e. Next, we show that for abortbad.e, we need to have d|am.
Again, assume d 6 |am for contradiction. Then, d|c · bm and d|e by definition of d. Hence, e 6 |am + c · bm, and
again ¬abortbad.e is implied.
So we can assume d 6= e and d|am without loss of generality in our analysis of abortbad.e. Then abortbad.e
is equivalent to
am + c · bm = 0 mod e ⇔ am
d
+ (c1 + c2|G|)bm
d
= 0 mod
e
d
⇔ c2 = −|G|−1
(
am
d
(
bm
d
)−1
+ c1
)
,
which occurs with probability at most 1/3 + 1/N due to the distribution of c2. (Note that |G| = p′q′ is
invertible modulo e/d since |p′|, |q′| are prime and longer than e, and bm/d is invertible by construction of
d.) We get
Pr [X4] ≥ Pr [X3 ∧ ¬abortbad.e] ≥
(
2
3
− 1
N
)
Pr [X3] ≥ 1
2
· Pr [X3] . (34)
Game 5. We now abort and raise event abortbad.a if am (obtained from PHF.TrapEval(t,m)) is zero for the
adversary’s forgery message m. The programmability of H directly implies
Pr [X5] ≥ Pr [X4 ∧ ¬abortbad.a] ≥ δPr [X4] . (35)
Now from Game 5, we can now construct an adversary A on the strong RSA assumption. A takes inputs
N and g˜ ∈ Z∗N and simulates Game 5 with adversary F2. A uses g˜ as well as N just as if it was selected
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by the experiment; note that in Game 5, no inversion of exponents is necessary anymore. Now whenever F2
outputs a forgery, this implies in particular that no abortbad.e event was raised and we have
f := gcd(am + c · bm, e) = gcd(2(am + c · bm)
∏
x∈E
x, e) < e,
so that we can use Lemma 14 to compute g˜e/f from every successful forgery
y =
(
gamhbm
)1/e
=
(
g˜2(am+c·bm)
∏
x∈E x
)1/e
.
Hence we can compute a nontrivial root of the challenge g˜ and thus break the strong RSA assumption:
′ ≥ Pr [X5] . (36)
Putting (30-36) together yields Lemma 16 and completes the proof of Theorem 13
7 Signature Sizes
In this section we compute the concrete size of our bilinear maps signatures SIGBM[H] when instantiated
with the multi-generator PHF HMG and compare it to the size of known schemes. A similar comparison can
be made for our RSA signatures SIGRSA[H]. Here we only focus on signature sizes. Let us stress again that
the key sizes of our signature schemes are considerably larger compared to other schemes.
7.1 Concrete Security
This subsection follows the concrete security approach by Bellare and Ristenpart [5], which in turn builds
upon the concrete success measure from [42].
For any adversary A running in time T(A) and gaining advantage  we define the success ratio of A to
be SR(A) := /T(A). The ratio of A’s advantage to its running time provides a measure of the efficiency of
the adversary. Generally speaking, to resist an adversary with success ration SR(A), a scheme should choose
its security parameter (bits of security) such that SR(A) ≤ 2−k (with respect to the best known attack).
Security of the q-DH Assumption. We consider Cheon’s attacks against the q-DH assumption [25] over
groups of prime order p. The main result of [25] is that there exists an adversary P such that
SR(P) = P
T(P) =
T2(P) · q
p ·T(P) = Ω(
√
q/p) .
For our analysis we make the assumption that
√
q/p is the maximal success ratio of an adversary against
the q-DH problem, i.e., that
SR(B) ≤
√
q/p, (37)
for all possible adversaries B. (We note that SR(P) = Θ(√q/p) matches the generic lower bounds from [11].)
Our signature scheme SIGBM[H]. For our setting, we consider an uf-cma adversaryA against the signature
scheme SIGBM[H] that makes q signing queries, runs in time T(A), and has advantage . We can relate the
success ratio of A to the success ration of the adversary B against the q-DH problem from our reduction.
Namely, applying Theorem 10 we have that
SR(A) ≤ 1
T(B) · (
q
δ
· ′ + q
m+1
2ηm
) =
q
δ
· SR(B) + q
m+1
2ηm
· 1
T(B) ≤
q
δ
· SR(B) + q
m
2ηm
. (38)
We want that the signature scheme has k bit security, i.e., that SR(A) ≤ 2−k. Combining this with (37)
and (38) we obtain
SR(A) ≤ q
δ
·
√
q/p+
qm
2ηm
≤ 2−k+1 . (39)
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(To simplify the upcoming equations we only opt for k − 1 bit security.) We are interested in the minimal
choice of the group order p and the (bit-)length η of the randomness such that the above equation holds.
Clearly, (39) is satisfied if both,
η ≥ log q + k
m
(40)
and
log p ≥ 2k + 3 log q − 2 log δ (41)
hold.
The signature scheme by Boneh and Boyen. The security reduction for Boneh/Boyen signatures to
the q-DH assumption is tight, i.e., SR(A) ≈ SR(B) ≤ √p/q which, for k bit security, again has to be
bounded by 2−k. Therefore we need to chose p such that
log p ≥ 2k + 2 log q . (42)
Note the size of the randomness η in the Boneh/Boyen signatures is always fixed, i.e., η = log p.
7.2 Concrete comparison
We make a comparison for k = 80 bits. For concreteness we consider the instantiation SIGBM[H
MG] for the
hash function HMG from Definition 3. By Theorem 5 this is a the (2, 1)-PHF with δ = 1c` ≈ 2−3 log k and
γ = 0. We will perform two types of comparisons.
Ignoring increase of the group. First, as it is common in the literature [28,33,11], we ignore the penalty
imposed on the group size due to the non-tight reduction and Cheon’s attack. That is, ignoring (41) and
(42) we always chose log p = 2k bits, independent of the number of signature queries an adversary can make.
This is reasonable when one views a security reduction as an asymptotic indicator of security. However, the
bound from (40) on the randomness η cannot be ignored since, as shown in the introduction, this may lead
to an actual attack on the signature scheme. The signatures of SIGBM[H] consist of one group element plus η
bit randomness, the signatures of SIGBB of one group element plus randomness which consists of one element
from Zp. On special Bilinear Maps with the representation of one element in |G| takes exactly log p = 2k
bits [11], we obtain
|SIGBM[H]| = log p+ η = 2k + log q + k
m
, |SIGBB| = 2 log p = 4k .
For different choices of k and q the resulting signature sizes are given in the top two rows of Table 2.
For example, for k = 80 bits security, it seems realistic to assume that an adversary makes maximal q ∈
{220, 230, 240} signature queries.
Taking the increase of the group into account. We now compute the signature sizes when also
taking the increase of the underlying group size into account. Using (41) and (40) for SIGBM[H] and (42) for
SIGBB we obtain
|SIGBM[H]| = log p+ η = k(2 + 1
m
) + 6 log k + 4 log q, |SIGBB| = 2 log p = 4k + 4 log q .
For different choices of k and q the signature sizes are given in the bottom two rows of Table 2.
Online/offline signature generation. We mention, however, that the Boneh-Boyen signature has an
interesting online/offline property. Namely, almost all of the computational work of signing can be outsourced
into a precomputation phase. Later, when the messages to be signed are known, using the precomputation
results, signatures can be prepared extremely efficiently. Our scheme SIGBM[H] does not seem to inherit this
property.
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Scheme Signature size
k = 80 k = 128 k = 256
q = 220 q = 230 q = 240 q = 232 q = 248 q = 264 q = 264 q = 296 q = 2128
Fixed Group Size
Boneh-Boyen [11] 320 320 320 512 512 512 1024 1024 1024
Ours: SIGBM[H
MG] 220 230 240 352 368 384 704 736 768
Variable Group Size
Boneh-Boyen [11] 400 440 480 640 704 768 2304 2432 2560
Ours: SIGBM[H
MG] 316 356 396 490 554 618 944 1072 1200
Table 2. Recommended signature sizes of different schemes. The top two rows give the sizes when ignoring the
increase of the group due to the non-tight generic bounds and the bottom two rows take the latter into account.
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A Proofs from Section 3
A.1 Random walks and the full proof of Theorem 5
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 5. As indicated, this requires some work; in particular, we need
some theory about random walks. For a thorough introduction, we refer to [47,32]. Here, we will only use
(variations of) some elementary results. For self-containment, we give some basic proofs below.
The first theorem summarizes some elementary facts about one-dimensional random walks:
Theorem 17 (Random walks with {−1, 1}-steps). Let µ ∈ N>0 and a′1, . . . , a′µ ∈ {−1, 1} be indepen-
dently and uniformly distributed random variables. For i ∈ Z, let
p′µ(i) := Pr
 µ∑
j=1
a′j = i
 ,
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where the probability is over the a′i. Then
p′µ(i) = 0 if i 6≡ µ mod 2, (43)
p′µ(−i) = p′µ(i) for i ∈ Z, (44)
p′µ(i+ 2) ≤ p′µ(i) for i ∈ N0, i ≡ µ mod 2, (45)
p′µ+2(0) < p
′
µ(0). (46)
Furthermore, there exists Λ′ > 0 and, for every c > 0, also λ′c > 0, such that for all i with i ≡ µ mod 2 and
|i| ≤ c√µ,
λ′c ≤ p′µ(i)
√
µ ≤ Λ′. (47)
Proof. (43) and (44) follow from the definition, and (45) is easiest seen by writing
p′µ(i) = 2
−µ
(
µ
(µ+ i)/2
)
= 2−µ
µ!
(µ/2 + i/2)!(µ/2− i/2)!
(for i ∈ N0, i ≡ µ mod 2) for p′µ(i) and p′µ(i+ 2) and subtracting them. (46) follows by observing that
p′µ+2(0) =
p′µ(−2) + 2p′µ(0) + p′µ(2)
4
(44)
=
p′µ(2) + p
′
µ(0)
2
(45)
≤ p′µ(0).
To see the upper bound in (47), we may assume i ≥ 0 because of (44). Note that
p′µ(i)
(45)
≤ p′µ(i mod 2) = 2−µ
(
µ
dµ/2e
)
= 2−µ
µ!
dµ/2e!bµ/2c!
(∗)
= Θ(1/
√
µ),
where (∗) uses Stirling’s approximation. (Θ is asymptotic in µ.) For the lower bound, m′ := bc√µc, and
m := m′ − ((µ−m′) mod 2), so m is the largest possible value for i in (47). Now
p′µ(i)
(45)
≥ p′µ(m) = 2−µ
(
µ
(µ+m)/2
)
= 2−µ
µ!
((µ+m)/2)!((µ−m)/2)!
(∗)
= Θ
(√
µ
(µ+m)(µ−m) ·
µ2µ
(µ+m)µ+m(µ−m)µ−m
)
= Θ
(√
1
µ
· 1
(1− m2µ2 )µ−m
· 1
(1 + mµ )
2m
)
≥ Θ
(
1√
µ
· 1
(1 + c√µ )
2c
√
µ
)
= Θ
(
1√
µ
· e−2c2
)
= Θ
(
1√
µ
)
as desired, where (∗) denotes again Stirling’s approximation.
However, for our purposes, it is more useful to allow zero-steps, since this avoids (43).
Theorem 18 (Random walks with {−1, 0, 1}-steps). Let µ ∈ N>0 and a1, . . . , aµ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} be inde-
pendently and uniformly distributed random variables. For i ∈ Z, let
pµ(i) := Pr
 µ∑
j=1
aj = i
 ,
where the probability is over the ai. Then
pµ(−i) = pµ(i) for i ∈ Z, (48)
pµ(i+ 1) ≤ pµ(i) for i ∈ N0. (49)
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Furthermore, there exists Λ > 0 and, for every c > 0, also λc > 0, such that for all i with |i| ≤ c√µ,
λc ≤ pµ(i)√µ ≤ Λ. (50)
Also,
λc
Λ
pµ(i1) ≤ pµ(i2) ≤ Λ
λc
pµ(i1) (51)
for arbitrary i1, i2 with |i1|, |i2| ≤ c√µ. Finally, for every c > 0, there exists Γc > 0 independent of µ such
that
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣
µ∑
j=1
aj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ c√µ
 ≥ Γc. (52)
Proof. (48) follows from the definition. (49) can be seen by induction on µ. For µ = 1, (49) is clear. Now
assume (49) for µ and, for i ≥ 0, consider
pµ+1(i) =
pµ(i− 1) + pµ(i) + pµ(i+ 1)
3
≥ pµ(i) + pµ(i+ 1) + pµ(i+ 2)
3
= pµ+1(i+ 1).
This shows (49) for µ + 1, and hence in general. Next, we prove the upper bound in (50). To this end, let
n0 := |{j | aj = 0}| be the number of zeros among the aj . Clearly, the expectation value of n0 is µ/3. Hence,
using Hoeffding’s inequality, we first obtain
Pr [n0 ≥ µ/2] ≤ e−µ/18. (53)
We get
pµ(i)
(49)
≤ pµ(0) = Pr
∑
aj 6=0
aj = 0
 = bµ/2c∑
i=0
Pr
∑
aj 6=0
aj = 0 | n0 = µ− 2i
Pr [n0 = µ− 2i]
=
bµ/2c∑
i=0
p′2i(0)Pr [n0 = µ− 2i]
(53)
≤ e−µ/18 +
bµ/2c∑
i=bµ/4c
p′2i(0)Pr [n0 = µ− 2i]
(46)
≤ e−µ/18 +
bµ/2c∑
i=bµ/4c
p′2bµ/4c(0)Pr [n0 = µ− 2i] ≤ e−µ/18 + p′2bµ/4c(0)
(47)
= Θ(1/
√
µ).
This provides an upper bound Λ on pµ(i)/
√
µ. To derive a lower bound, assume a fixed c > 0, and write
m := 2dc√µ/2e (i.e., m is the smallest even upper bound on c√µ). We get:
pµ(i)
(49)
≥ pµ(m) = Pr
∑
aj 6=0
aj = m
 = bµ/2c∑
i=0
Pr
∑
aj 6=0
aj = m | n0 = µ− 2i
Pr [n0 = µ− 2i]
=
bµ/2c∑
i=0
p′2i(m)Pr [n0 = µ− 2i]
(53)
≥ −e−µ/18 +
bµ/2c∑
i=bµ/4c
p′2i(m)Pr [n0 = µ− 2i | n0 ≤ µ/2]
(47)
≥ −e−µ/18 +
bµ/2c∑
i=bµ/4c
λd√
2i
Pr [n0 = µ− 2i | n0 ≤ µ/2] = Θ( λd√
2bµ/2c ) = Θ(1/
√
µ),
where d is a (asymptotic in µ) constant upper bound on m/
√
2bµ/4c = 2dc√µ/2e/√2bµ/4c, so that we can
use (47).
Finally, (51) and (52) are immediate consequences of (50).
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We establish a small piece of notation: for a1, . . . , aµ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and X ⊆ [µ], we abbreviate
∑
i∈X ai
with a(X). The following lemma is the “non-splitting” argument already mentioned in the informal proof
of Theorem 5.
Lemma 19. Let µ ∈ N>0 and a1, . . . , aµ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} be independently and uniformly distributed random
variables. Let ∅ ( R ( S ⊂ [µ]. Let c > 0 and t ∈ Z with |t| ≤ c√|S| be arbitrary. Then
max
i
Pr [a(R) = i | a(S) = t] ≤ 1
1 + λ1λc+1Λ2
. (54)
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume t ≥ 0; the case t < 0 is symmetric. Fix a value i∗ for i that
maximizes the probability in (54). We first claim that we can assume 0 ≤ i∗ ≤ t without loss of generality.
To see this, consider
Pr [a(R) = i∗ | a(S) = t] = Pr [a(R) = i
∗ ∧ a(S) = t]
Pr [a(S) = t]
=
Pr [a(R) = i∗ ∧ a(S \R) = t− i∗]
Pr [a(S) = t]
=
Pr [a(R) = i∗]Pr [a(S \R) = t− i∗]
Pr [a(S) = t]
. (55)
If i∗ < 0, then Pr [a(R) = i∗] ≤ Pr [a(R) = 0] and Pr [a(S \R) = t− i∗] ≤ Pr [a(S \R) = t− 0] by (49), so
we can set i∗ = 0 as a value that maximizes (55). Similarly, i∗ > t implied Pr [a(R) = i∗] ≤ Pr [a(R) = t] and
Pr [a(S \R) = t− i∗] ≤ Pr [a(S \R) = t− t], so we can use i∗ = t instead. Hence, we can assume 0 ≤ i∗ ≤ t.
In fact, we may assume that:
(a) i∗ ≤ c√|R|, or
(b) t− i∗ ≤ c√|S \R|.
Namely, if neither (a) nor (b) were satisfied, we would have the contradiction
t = i∗ + (t− i∗) > c
√
|R|+ c
√
|S \R| > c
√
|R|+ |S \R| = c
√
|S| ≥ t.
If (a) holds, then i∗ + 1 ≤ c√|R|+ 1 ≤ (c+ 1)√|R|, so
Pr [a(R) = i∗ + 1] = p|R|(i∗ + 1)
(51)
≥ λc+1
Λ
p|R|(i∗) =
λc+1
Λ
Pr [a(R) = i∗] . (56)
Furthermore,
Pr [a(S \R) = t− (i∗ + 1)] = p|S\R|(t− (i∗ + 1)) ≥ λ1
Λ
p|S\R|(t− i∗) = λ1
Λ
Pr [a(s \R) = t− i∗] (57)
either trivially by (49) (in case i∗ < t, and using that λ1 ≤ Λ), or by (51) (in case i∗ = t, and using that
then |t− i∗|, |t− (i∗ + 1)| ≤ 1 ≤√|S \R|). Combining (56,57) yields
Pr [a(R) = i∗ + 1 ∧ a(S) = t] ≥ λ1λc+1
Λ2
Pr [a(R) = i∗ ∧ a(S) = t] ,
whence
max
i
Pr [a(R) = i | a(S) = t] = Pr [a(S) = t ∧ a(R) = i
∗]
Pr [a(S) = t]
≤ Pr [a(S) = t ∧ a(R) = i
∗]
Pr [a(R) ∈ {i∗, i∗ + 1} ∧ a(S) = t]
≤ Pr [a(S) = t ∧ a(R) = i
∗]
Pr [a(R) = i∗ ∧ a(S) = t] + Pr [a(R) = i∗ + 1 ∧ a(S) = t] ≤
1
1 + λ1λc+1Λ2
,
which shows (54). The case (b) is symmetric.
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Lemma 20. Let µ ∈ N>0 and a1, . . . , aµ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} be independently and uniformly distributed random
variables. Assume fixed nonempty sets X,Y ⊆ [µ]. Define ∆X := X \ Y , ∆Y := Y \X, and ∆XY = X ∩ Y .
Denote by SMALL the event that
a(∆X), a(∆Y ), a(∆XY ) ≤
√
min{|∆X |, |∆Y |, |∆XY |}+ 1
Then
Pr [a(X) = a(Y ) = 1 ∧ SMALL] ≥ 2λ1λ2Γ1
µ
(58)
Proof. Note that ∆X ∪∆Y ∪∆XY = X ∪Y , where the union on the left-hand side is disjoint. First, we treat
the case |∆XY | ≥ |∆X |, |∆Y |. In this case, we assume without loss of generality |∆X | ≥ |∆Y | and hence
|∆XY | ≥ |∆X | ≥ |∆Y |. Let E denote the event that |a(∆Y )| ≤
√|∆Y |, and let F denote the event that
a(∆X) = a(∆Y ). We obtain
Pr [E] = Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈∆Y
aj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤√|∆Y |
 (52)≥ Γ1 (59)
and
Pr [F | E] ≥ min
|i|≤|∆Y |
Pr [a(∆X) = i | E] (∗)= min|i|≤|∆Y |Pr [a(∆X) = i]
= min
|i|≤|∆Y |
p|∆X |(i)
(50)
|∆Y |≤|∆X |≥ λ1√|∆X | , (60)
where (∗) uses that E is independent of a(∆X). Combining (59,60) gives
Pr [E ∧ F ] = Pr [F | E]Pr [E] ≥ λ1Γ1/
√
|∆X |. (61)
Now since E ∧ F implies a(X) = a(Y ) as well as |a(∆X)| = |a(∆Y )| ≤
√|∆Y | ≤√|∆XY |,
Pr [a(X) = a(Y ) = 1 | E ∧ F ] = Pr [a(∆XY ) = 1− a(∆X) | E ∧ F ]
≥ min
|i|≤
√
|∆Y |+1
Pr [a(∆XY ) = i | E ∧ F ] (∗)= min
|i|≤
√
|∆Y |+1
Pr [a(∆XY ) = i]
= min
|i|≤
√
|∆Y |+1
p|∆XY |(i)
(50)√
|∆Y |+1≤2
√
|∆XY |
≥ λ2√|∆XY | , (62)
where (∗) uses that E ∧ F is independent of a(∆XY ). Now observe that a(X) = a(Y ) = 1 ∧ E ∧ F implies
|a(∆X)| = |a(∆Y )| ≤
√|∆Y | along with |a(∆XY )| = |1 − a(∆Y )| ≤ √|∆Y | + 1. Hence, a(X) = a(Y ) =
1 ∧ E ∧ F implies SMALL, and we obtain
Pr [a(X) = a(Y ) = 1 ∧ SMALL] ≥ Pr [a(X) = a(Y ) = 1 ∧ E ∧ F ]
= Pr [a(X) = a(Y ) = 1 | E ∧ F ]Pr [E ∧ F ]
(61,62)
≥ λ1λ2Γ1√|∆X | · |∆XY |
(∗)
≥ 2λ1λ2Γ1
µ
as desired, where (∗) uses that |∆X |+ |∆XY | = |X| ≤ µ and hence12 |∆X | · |∆XY | ≤ (µ/2)2.
The cases |∆X | ≥ |∆XY |, |∆Y | and |∆Y | ≥ |∆XY |, |∆X | can be treated analogously.
12 for a, b ∈ R, we have a2 − 2ab+ b2 = (a− b)2 ≥ 0⇒ a2 + 2ab+ b2 = (a+ b)2 ≥ 4ab⇒ ((a+ b)/2)2 ≥ ab
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Lemma 21. In the situation of Lemma 20, let additionally Z ⊆ [µ], Z 6= ∅, X, Y . Then
Pr [a(Z) 6= 1 | a(X) = a(Y ) = 1 ∧ SMALL] ≥ λ1λ2
λ1λ2 + Λ2
. (63)
Proof. Let ZX := Z ∩ ∆X , ZY := Z ∩ ∆Y , and ZXY := Z ∩ ∆XY . Write G shorthand for the event
a(X) = a(Y ) = 1 ∧ SMALL.
Now first, if Z 6= ZX ∪ ZY ∪ ZXY , then there is an index j ∈ Z \ (X ∪ Y ), and hence
Pr [a(Z) 6= 1 | G] = Pr [aj 6= 1− a(Z \ {j}) | G] ≥ min|i|≤1Pr [aj 6= i | G]
(∗)
= min
|i|≤1
Pr [aj 6= i] = 2/3.
Here, (∗) uses the fact that G and aj are independent. Since 0 < λc ≤ Λ for all c, we have 2/3 ≥ 1/2 ≥
λ1λ2
λ1λ2+Λ2
, and (63) follows. Hence, we may assume that Z completely decomposes into ZX , ZY , and ZXY .
Next, assume ZX 6= ∅, ∆X , so ∅ ( ZX ( ∆X . Observe that for mutually exclusive events Bi with
Pr [
∨
iBi] = 1, and arbitrary A, we have
Pr [A] =
∑
i
Pr [A ∧Bi] =
∑
i
Pr [A | Bi]Pr [Bi] ≤ max
i
Pr [A | Bi]
∑
i
Pr [Bi] = max
i
Pr [A | Bi] . (64)
Since G implies |a(∆X)| ≤
√|∆X |, we obtain
Pr [a(Z) = 1 | G]
(64)
≤ max
|t|≤
√
|∆X |
Pr [a(Z) = 1 | G ∧ a(∆X) = t]
(∗)
= max
|t|≤
√
|∆X |
i
Pr [a(ZX) = i | G ∧ a(∆X) = t] (∗)= max
|t|≤
√
|∆X |
i
Pr [a(ZX) = i | a(∆X) = t]
(†)
≤ 1
1 + λ1λ2Λ2
which implies (63). Here, (∗) uses that G only depends on a(∆X) (but not on the individual aj for j ∈ ∆X),
and (†) uses Lemma 19 with R = ZX , S = ∆X . Analogous reasoning shows that this holds also when
ZY 6= ∅, ∆Y and when ZXY 6= ∅, ∆XY .
So far we have shown (63) unless all of the following conditions are fulfilled: Z = ZX ∪ ZY ∪ ZXY ,
ZX ∈ {∅, ∆X}, ZY ∈ {∅, ∆Y }, and ZXY ∈ {∅, ∆XY }. That leaves only the following remaining possibilities:
– Z = X, or Z = Y , or Z = ∅: this cannot happen by assumption.
– Z = ∆X or Z = ∆Y or Z = ∆XY : using Lemma 19 (e.g., in case Z = ∆X with R = Z = ∆X and
S = X) shows (63).
– Z = ∆X ∪∆Y ∪∆XY = X ∪ Y : we can use Lemma 19 with R = X and S = Z = X ∪ Y to show (63).
– Z = ∆X ∪ ∆Y : in this case, a(X) = a(Y ) = 1 would imply a(∆X) + a(∆XY ) = a(X) = a(Y ) =
a(∆Y ) + a(∆XY ), whence a(∆X) = a(∆Y ). Thus a(Z) = a(∆X) + a(∆Y ) = 2a(∆X) 6= 1 always, and
Lemma 19 follows.
Summarizing, this shows (63) in general.
Now we can combine Lemma 20 and Lemma 21 to obtain
Theorem 22. Let µ ∈ N>0 and a1, . . . , aµ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} be independently and uniformly distributed random
variables. Assume fixed nonempty sets X,Y, Z ⊆ [µ] with Z 6= X,Y . Then
Pr [a(X) = a(Y ) = 1 6= a(Z)] ≥ λ
2
1λ
2
2Γ1
λ1λ2 + Λ2
· 1
µ
.
This finally proves Theorem 5 if we just adapt notation: in the situation of the proof sketch of Theorem 5
and Definition 1, set X = X1, Y = X2, Z = Z1, and µ = `, then apply Theorem 22. (Note that at
this point, we crucially use that we have hardwired a0 := −1, so that, e.g., aX1 = a(X) − 1, and thus
aX1 = 0⇔ a(X) = 1.)
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We use PHF.Gen and PHF.TrapGen algorithms similar to those from Theorem 5. First, let J = J(k)
be a positive function (we will optimize the choice of J later). Then define
– PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) chooses uniformly and independently aij ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` and 1 ≤ j ≤ J ,
as well as random group exponents b0, . . . , b`. It sets ai =
∑J
j=1 aij and then h0 = g
−1hb0 and hi = gaihbi
for all i. It finally returns K = (h0, . . . , h`) and t = (b0, a1, b1, . . . , a`, b`).
– PHF.TrapEval(t,X) parses X = (x1, . . . , x`) ∈ {0, 1}` and returns a = −1 +
∑`
i=1 aixi and b = b0 +∑`
i=1 bixi.
The main difference to the functions from Theorem 5 is that the ai are not chosen from {−1, 0, 1} but
instead in turn as random walks of length J . Now adding r independent random walks of length J just yields
a random walk of length rJ . Hence, we obtain that for all keys K ′, all X ∈ {0, 1}`, and for the exponent aX
output by PHF.TrapEval(t,X):
Θ
(
1/
√
`J
)
≤ Pr [aX = 0] ≤ Θ
(
1/
√
J
)
,
and with techniques from Appendix A.1, we obtain for all X,Y ∈ {0, 1}` with X 6= Y :
Pr [aZ = 0 | aX = 0] = Θ(1/
√
J)
Hence for all X1, Z1, . . . , Zq, we have
Pr
[
aX1 = 0 ∧ aZ1 , . . . , aZq 6= 0
]
= Pr [aX1 = 0]Pr
[
aZ1 , . . . , aZq 6= 0 | aX1 = 0
]
≥ Θ(1/
√
`J)
(
1−
q∑
i=1
Pr [aZi = 0 | aX1 = 0]
)
≥ Θ(1/
√
`J)(1− qΘ(1/
√
J)).
Setting J suitably in the order of q2 proves the theorem.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. Fix PPT algorithms PHF.TrapGen and PHF.TrapEval and assume ` = 2 without loss of general-
ity. Consider X1 = (1, 1), X2 = (1, 0), X3 = (0, 0), and Z1 = (0, 1). Assume that K
′, t have been gen-
erated via PHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) for uniform g, h ∈ G. Define (aX , bX) for X ∈ {0, 1}` as the result of
PHF.TrapEval(t,X). Assume that aX1 = aX2 = aX3 = 0, which implies that
HMGK′ (X1) = h0h1h2 = h
bX1 , HMGK′ (X2) = h0h1 = h
bX2 , HMGK′ (X3) = h0 = h
bX3 .
We will show now that aZ1 6= 0 allows to efficiently compute dlogh(g), which proves the theorem. Namely,
aZ1 6= 0 implies
gaZ1hbZ1 = HMGK′ (Z1) = h0h2 =
HMGK′ (X1) ·HMGK′ (X3)
HMGK′ (X2)
.
Considering the discrete logarithms to base h yields
dlogh(g)aZ1 + bZ1 = bX1 − bX2 + bX3 mod |G|
and hence, whenever aZ1 6= 0 and |G| is known and prime, we can efficiently obtain dlogh(g), solving the
discrete logarithm problem for h and g.
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B Randomized Programmable Hash Functions
B.1 Definitions
A randomized group hash function RH = (RPHF.Gen,RPHF.Eval) for a group family G = (Gk) and with
input length ` = `(k) and randomness space R = (Rk) consists of two PPT algorithms. For security
parameter k ∈ N, a key K $← RPHF.Gen(1k) is generated by the key generation algorithm RPHF.Gen.
This key K can then be used for the deterministic evaluation algorithm RPHF.Eval to evaluate RH via
y ← RPHF.Eval(K,X; r) ∈ G for any X ∈ {0, 1}` and r ∈ R. We write RHK(X; r) = RPHF.Eval(K,X; r).
Definition 23. A randomized group hash function RH is an (m,n, γ, δ)-programmable randomized hash
function if there are PPT algorithms RPHF.TrapGen (the trapdoor key generation algorithm), RPHF.TrapEval
(the deterministic trapdoor evaluation algorithm), and RPHF.TrapRand (the deterministic randomness gen-
erator) such that the following holds:
Syntactics: For g, h ∈ G, the trapdoor key generation (K ′, t) $← RPHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) outputs a key
K ′ and a trapdoor t. Trapdoor evaluation (a(·), b(·))← RPHF.TrapEval(t,X) produces two deterministic
polynomial-time functions a(·) and b(·), for any X ∈ {0, 1}`. Moreover, r ← RPHF.TrapRand(t,X, i)
produces an element r from R, for any X ∈ {0, 1}` and index 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Correctness: We demand RHK′(X; r) = RPHF.Eval(K
′, X; r) = ga(r)hb(r) for all g, h ∈ G and all possible
(K ′, t) $← RPHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h), for all X ∈ {0, 1}` and 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (a(·), b(·))← RPHF.TrapEval(t,X),
and for r ← RPHF.TrapEval(t,X, i).
Statistically close trapdoor keys: For K
$← RPHF.Eval(1k) and (K ′, t) $← RPHF.Eval(1k), the keys K
and K ′ are statistically γ-close: K
γ≡ K ′.
Close to uniform randomness: For all g, h ∈ G and all K ′ in the range of (the first component of)
RPHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h), for all X1, . . . , Xm, and rXi ← RPHF.TrapRand(t,Xi, i), the rXi are distributed
statistically γ-close to independently uniform over R (over all possible t).
Well-distributed logarithms: For all g, h ∈ G and all K ′ in the range of (the first component of)
RPHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h), for all X1, . . . , Xm, Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ {0, 1}` with Xi 6= Zj for any i, j, for all
r˜1, . . . , r˜n ∈ R, and for all (aXi(·), bXi(·)) ← RPHF.TrapEval(t,Xi), rXi ← RPHF.TrapRand(t,Xi, i)
and (aZi(·), bZi(·))← RPHF.TrapEval(t, Zi), we have
Pr [aX1(rX1) = . . . = aXm(rXm) = 0 ∧ aZ1(r˜1), . . . , aZn(r˜n) 6= 0] ≥ δ, (65)
where the probability is over the trapdoor t that was produced along with K ′. Here Xi may depend on all
Xj and rXj for j < i, and the Z1, . . . , Zn may depend on all Xi and rXi .
If γ is negligible and δ is noticeable, we simply call RH (m,n)-programmable.
We remark that RPHFs are a strict generalization of PHFs from Section 3. Furthermore, it can be verified
that our two applications of PHFs from Section 4 can also be securely instantiated with RPHFs.
B.2 Construction
In the following we denote [x]2` := x mod 2
`. The first randomized programmable hash function is variant
of a hash function implicitly used in a construction by Fischlin [33].
Definition 24. Let G = (Gk) be a group family, and let ` = `(k) be a polynomial. Then we define the
following group hash function RHF = (RPHF.Gen,RPHF.Eval) with input length ` = `(k) and randomness
space R = {0, 1}`:
– RPHF.Gen(1k) returns a uniformly and independently sampled K = (h0, h1, h2) ∈ G3.
– RPHF.Eval(K,X; r) parses K = (h0, h1, h2) ∈ G3, X ∈ {0, 1}`, r ∈ {0, 1}`, computes and returns
RHFK(X; r) = h0h
r
1h
[r+X]
2`
2
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Theorem 25. For any group G with known order, RHF is a (1, 1, 0, 1/2)-programmable randomized hash
function.
Proof. Consider the following algorithms:
– RPHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) chooses uniformly and independently r1 ∈ {0, 1}` and random group exponents
b0, b1, b2. It picks a random vector ∆ = (∆1, ∆2) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}. It sets h0 = g−r1hb0 , h1 = g∆1hb1 ,
h2 = g
∆2hb2 . It returns K = (h0, h1, h2) and t = (r1, b0, b1, b2, ∆).
– RPHF.TrapEval(t,X, 1): It defines and returns the functions a(s) and b(s) as a(s) = −r1 +∆1s+∆2[s+
X]2` , b(s) = b0 + b1s+ b2[s+X]2` .
– RPHF.TrapRand(t,X, 1): It computes and returns r = ∆1r1 +∆2[r1 −X]2` .
Clearly, rX1 ← RPHF.TrapRand(t,X1, 1) equals r1 which is uniform random, for any K. We have to
show that for all X1 6= Z1 ∈ {0, 1}`, for all r˜1 ∈ R, and for the corresponding (aX1(·), bX1(·), rX1) ←
RPHF.TrapEval(t,X1, 1) and (aZ1(·), bZ1(·))← RPHF.TrapEval(t, Z1,⊥), we have
Pr [aX1(rX1) = 0 ∧ aZ1(r˜1) 6= 0] ≥ δ.
By construction we have
aX1(rX1) = −r1 +∆1(∆1r1 +∆2[r1 +X1]2`) +∆2(∆1r1 +∆2[[r1 +X1]2` −X1]2`) = 0,
always, and independent of everything else. It leaves to consider Pr[aZ1(r˜1) 6= 0]. We distinguish between
two cases. If r˜1 6= rX1 , then
Pr[aZ1(r˜1) 6= 0] ≥ Pr[aZ1(r˜1) 6= 0 | ∆ = (1, 0)] Pr[∆ = (1, 0)] =
1
2
Pr[−r1 + r˜1 6= 0] = 1
2
,
since ∆ = (1, 0) implies r˜1 = rX1 = r1. If r˜1 = rX1 , then
Pr[aZ1(r˜1) 6= 0] ≥ Pr[aZ1(r˜1) 6= 0 | ∆ = (0, 1)] Pr[∆ = (0, 1)]
=
1
2
Pr[−r1 + [Z1 + [r1 −X1]2` ]2` 6= 0] =
1
2
,
since ∆ = (0, 1) implies r˜1 = rX1 = [r1 −X1]2` .
Again, the above theorem also generalizes to groups of unknown order.
Theorem 26. For the group G = QRN of quadratic residues modulo N = pq for safe distinct primes p and
q, the function RHF is a 2`-bounded (1, 1, 3/N, 1/2)-programmable randomized hash function.
Now if we just write things differently, we obtain the RPHF that was (implicitly) used in Okamoto’s
scheme from [57]. In particular, Okamoto’s scheme can be explained as our bilinear signature scheme
SIGBM[RH], instantiated with a suitable RPHF RH
L over a cyclic group. Formally:
Definition 27. Let G = (Gk) be a group family, where Gk is of order pk. Then, we define RHL =
(RPHF.Gen,RPHF.Eval) as the following group hash function with randomness space R = Zp(k):
– RPHF.Gen(1k) returns a uniformly and independently sampled K = (h′0, h
′
1, h
′
2) ∈ G3.
– RPHF.Eval(K,X; r) parses K = (h′0, h
′
1, h
′
2) ∈ G3, X ∈ Zp(k), r ∈ R, computes and returns
RHLK(X; r) = h
′
0h
′
1
r
h′2
X
The proof of the following theorem follows from the proof of Theorem 25 if we just set
h′0 = h0 h
′
1 = h1 h
′
2 = h2h1
and replace the computation modulo 2` in the exponent by a computation modulo the (known) group order
|G|.
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Theorem 28. For any group G with known order, RHL is a (1, 1, 0, 1/2)-programmable randomized hash
function.
Again, the theorem also generalizes to groups |G| of unknown order where we have to statistically approximate
the group order. In fact, we can even work with a significantly shorter randomness space:
Theorem 29. For the group G = QRN of quadratic residues modulo N = pq for safe distinct primes p and
q, the function RHL with randomness space R = {0, 1}L for L ≥ `+k is a 2L-bounded (1, 1, 3/N +1/k, 1/2)-
programmable randomized hash function.
We can prove Theorem 29 using a trapdoor key setup similar to the one for the case of a known group order.
Concretely, RPHF.TrapGen(1k, g, h) tosses a random coin ∆ ∈ {0, 1} and sets up
h′0 = g
−r1hb0 h′1 = gh
b1 h′2 = g
∆hb2 .
With this setup, we get in particular aX(r) = r+∆X − r1. Hence, trapdoor randomness generation returns
r1−∆X. Because r1 ∈ {0, 1}L for L = `+ k and X ∈ {0, 1}`, this randomness value r1−∆X is statistically
close to uniform even for ∆ = 1.
In this way, we can explain the (implicit) RPHFs from the signature schemes of Camenisch and Lysyan-
skaya [21] (with L = ` + k + log2N) and a variant of Zhu [67] (with slightly larger randomness space
L = `+ k). Observe, however, that these constructions are not suitably bounded to achieve short signature
schemes through Theorem 13. Recall that Theorem 13 assumed bounded RPHFs to ensure that certain ex-
ponents are coprime (so Lemma 14 can be used to extract a nontrivial root). In the schemes [21,67], a more
direct investigation shows that even with the used (not suitably bounded) RPHFs, this coprimality holds
with large probability.
We finally note that it is possible to generalize RHF, resp. RHL to an (m, 1)-RPHF. However, also this
generalization is not sufficiently bounded in order to be useful to our applications of short signatures (cf. also
Footnote 6).
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